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THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND
CONSTITUTION
KEITH E. SEALING*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the frenzied rush to stamp out affirmative action in all of its
manifestations, courts and legislatures are losing sight of fundamental
realities. A key weapon in the destruction of affirmative action is the
myth that the Constitution requires a color-blind approach to all but a
very narrowly excepted class of race-based problems.' Indeed, if the
* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School (Atlanta). B.S. 1982, University of
Northern Colorado; J.D. 1985, Temple University School of Law.
1. For example, the Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, has defined affirmative action
as "affirmative racism." Gingrich Says Go Slow on Affirmative Action, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Feb. 14, 1997, at B1. In an interview in which Gingrich generally urged a "go-slow approach"
to federal legislative efforts to end affirmative action, the congressman stated, "We are going to
pursue an all-out effort to end affirmative racism in America." Id. Justice Clarence Thomas has
called affirmative action "racial paternalism." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). In addition, Professor Lino Graglia has likened race-
based remedial programs to a "fungus." Lino A. Graglia, Podberesky, Hopwood and Adarand:
Implications for the Future of Race-Based Programs, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 287, 293 (1996)
(stating "[r]acial preference programs are a fungus that can thrive only in the dark, covered by
evasion and deceit; the light of open discussion and criticism is more than they can survive").
Moreover, in passing Proposition 209, the California voters demonstrated their belief that the
University of California, whose racial preferences spawned the Bakke decision, has a racist
admissions policy. See New Admissions Policy at U. of California Graduate Schools Called
Discriminatory, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 28, 1997, at A43. A complaint filed with
the United States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights charges that the same entity
that was held to discriminate against Allan Bakke, a white male, based its admissions decisions
on criteria that favor whites and males. Although the California State University system has
always used some criteria in which women and minorities fared poorly (such as standardized
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trend in recent state referenda cases2 continues, we soon will have the
mythical color-blind Constitution that Justice Harlan first described
in his dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson.3 In Plessy, Justice
tests), past affirmative action programs had compensated. Now, however, there is a decline in
the number of minorities and women accepted into California's professional schools.
Proposition 209 amended the California Constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31. The
initiative, approved by 54% of California voters in the fall of 1996, eliminates all race and
gender preferences in state hiring, contracting and college admissions. A federal district court
blocked the measure in Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F.Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal.
1996). On April 8, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court's decision, upholding the constitutionality of the affirmative action ban. See
Coalitionfor Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997), reh'g en bane denied,
122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (997).
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that public college enrollment for African-
Americans, Latinos, and American Indian students will decline when Proposition 209 is applied
(although Asian-American enrollments will increase). See id. at 1435. In addition, and most
interestingly, the Ninth Circuit addressed the "political structure" line of cases-Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457
(1982), and Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527 (1982)-and held that the political
structure theory did not apply, even in light of potential arguments to the contrary from Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding Colorado's amendment unconstitutional as violative of
equal protection to homosexuals).
2. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); Pobresky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147
(4th Cir. 1994); see also Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir.
1997).
3. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Writing his
fhmous dissent, Justice Harlan stated, "The Constitution of the United States does not, I think,
permit any public authority the right to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the
enjoyment of those rights." Id. at 554. In a frequently quoted passage, Harlan later stated, "Our
Constitution is color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Id. at 559.
The "color-blind" ideal has been the theme of a number of books and articles. See ANDREW
KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION vii (1992) (contending that "the evidence I adduce
tends strongly to refute any... contention" that the Framers intended a color-blind application
of the Constitution); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of
Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 171
(1994) (noting that "the Constitution was, in modem constitutional parlance, facially neutral
while protecting racial subjugation by private parties and even government entities"); Bryan K.
Fair, Foreword: Rethinking the Colorblindness Model, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (1993);
Anthony P. Griffin, Is the Diminution of Civil Rights the Road to a Color-blind Society? The
Law ofMea Culpa, Notwithstanding, 21 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1996) (noting that whites'
admission of past mistakes in the area of race should not be used as ajustification for refusal to
use affirmative race-based measures); John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and
Merit: An Analysis of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313 (1994);
David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 99; Laurence H. Tribe, In
What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Color-Blind? 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 201
(1986) (questioning the "race neutralists" who would find race-based preferences presumptively
invalid except as a remedy for past discrimination); Brian C. Eades, Casenote, The United
States Supreme Court Goes Color-Blind: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 29 CREIGHTON L.
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Harlan stated that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. ' 4 The adoption of
Harlan's color-blind interpretation of the Constitution would almost
certainly eliminate race-based protections and benign racial
preferences 5 as unconstitutional.
This Article advocates that courts and legislatures should not read
the Constitution as a color-blind document. The Framers never
intended to create a color-blind Constitution,6 nor would such a
Constitution accurately reflect the social norms and mores of
contemporary American society. Accordingly, this author believes
that government institutions should not use the myth of a color-blind
Constitution to perpetuate the racial problems of a society that itself
has failed to reach color-blind status.7
Part II of this Article examines the United States Constitution, as
REV. 771 (1996) (arguing that all race-based affirmative action programs offend equal
protection).
4. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,203-38 (1995).
6. In fact, at the time of ratification, society used the Constitution's color distinctions to
oppress minorities. See infra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
7. The effects of the color-blind myth are already apparent in the nation's professional
schools. It is illustrative to note that after the University of California eliminated their
affirmative action program, the arrival of a sole African-American law student on the
University of California's Boalt Hall campus was cause for a press conference. See Sole Black
Law Student Sees Chance for Change, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 3. Following
California's conversion to color-blind admissions, African-American applications declined by
27%, and only 14% were admitted. The 1997 figures represent a decline of 81% from the 1996
figures. All fourteen students offered admission declined to enroll, leaving Eric Brooks, who
had been accepted for 1996 but who had deferred enrollment for one year, as the sole entering
African-American at Boalt Hall. Similarly, African-American enrollment at UCLA's law
school declined from nineteen students in 1996 to ten in 1997. At the University of Texas, four
African-American students enrolled in 1997, down from thirty-one in 1996. This is essentially
the result people predicted. See Linda Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education:
An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School
Admissions Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997).
Based upon statistical analysis of applicants' LSAT scores and grade point averages, 3% of
African-American law school applicants would have been admitted to law schools under a
color-blind approach, but, in fact, 26% were admitted. See id. at 14. Of 3,435 African-
Americans who were accepted to at least one law school in 1990-91, only 687 would have been
accepted using a color-blind model based on LSAT and GPA, and only 945 would have been
accepted if the LSAT score was excluded from the calculation. See id. at 15. Therefore, the
result of a color-blind admissions process would be "a law school student body that mirrored
the ethnic makeup of law schools of thirty years ago." Id. at 50.
1998]
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drafted and amended by the Bill of Rights,8 to show that the Framers
never intended the Constitution to be a color-blind document.
Additionally, Part H discusses the Reconstruction Amendments in an
effort to demonstrate that Congress passed on the opportunity to
render the Constitution truly color-blind and instead adopted the
lesser standard of equal protection, which explicitly rejects non-
discrimination. Part III examines the modem cases-from Bakke to
Metro Broadcasting-in which the Supreme Court often failed to
develop a majority opinion, but delineated the level of scrutiny
appropriate to race-based remedial measures. Part IV examines the
recent Supreme Court case, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,9 in
which the Court depended in part on the color-blindness theory for
dismantling an affirmative action program. Part IV also reviews two
lower court decisions that go beyond Adarand in the context of
affirmative action in academia.
Part V argues that some form of race-based affirmative action is
still needed and is constitutionally defensible. It also argues that, in
today's society, race is an appropriate proxy both for diversity and for
the status of a "victim of discrimination." This Article concludes that
there are compelling state interests in maintaining affirmative action
programs in academia,10 that affirmative action programs can be
narrowly tailored, and that race-neutral alternatives are not
practicable.
II. THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION
The Constitution is not a color-blind document. The early drafts of
8. U.S. CONST., amend. I-X.
9. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
10. Although affirmative action is under attack in a broad spectrum of contexts, this
Article focuses on higher education. It does so both because of the recent Court of Appeals
decisions in Podberesky and Hopwood, which, it is argued herein, were wrongly decided, and
because the competition for limited seats and scholarship money in academia is a zero-sum
game.
Economic game theory thinks in terms of zero-sum games, positive-sum games and
negative-sum games. In a zero-sum game, the gains of the winner are offset by the losses of the
loser, for a net zero effect. In a positive-sum game-a "win-win situation"--the gains to the
winner are greater than the losses of the loser or, alternatively, there are no losers. In a negative-
sum game, the losses to the loser are greater than the gains achieved by the winner or,
alternatively, there are no winners. See Roger Arnold, ECONOMICS (Vest, 1996).
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the Constitution indicate that the Framers' original intent was to
create a color-conscious document." In addition, Congress's failure
to make the Constitution truly color-blind with the Reconstruction
Amendments, and the Court's subsequent failure to use the
Constitution to cure the present effects of past discrimination, further
support the idea that the Constitution was not designed as a color-
blind document.
A. Original Intent
At the time that it was drafted, the Constitution was not color-
blind as to election to Congress' 2 or the Presidency.13 Each member
of the House of Representatives was required to have been a
"Citizen" for seven years, 14 and each member of the Senate was
required to have been a "Citizen" for nine years.' 5 The Framers of the
Constitution also required that the president have been a natural born
citizen or a citizen at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
16
1I. For an eloquent discussion of the far-from-color-blind origins of the Constitution, see
Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1987). Justice Marshall delivered his remarks on May 6, 1987 during the
bicentennial celebration of the Constitution. See id. at 1. Marshall stated:
Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by the framers
particularly profound. To the contrary, the government they devised was defective
from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war and momentous social
transformation to attain the system of constitutional government we hold as
fundamental today.
Id. at 2.
Similarly, Professor Kull has stated:
A blanket prohibition of racial classifications is impossible to locate in a literal reading
of the constitutional text, and it has never been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as
a requirement of the "equal protection of the laws" guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Yet the color-blind theme persists nevertheless, forming a seemingly
indispensable theme in the constitutional law of race.
KULL, supra note 3, at 1; see also Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (stating "[a]nd thus the framers, while speaking through the
Constitution in an unequivocal voice, at once promised freedom for whites and condemned
blacks to slavery")
12. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 and § 3.
13. See U.S. CONST. art.ll , § I.
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 1, cl. 5.
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These requirements were neutral on their face, but failed to include
any persons other than whites as citizens. African-Americans were
excluded from citizenship.' 7 In fact, the Supreme Court's analysis in
Dred Scottt8 of the Framers' original intent reveals that a "perpetual
and impassable barrier was intended to be erected between the white
race and the one they had reduced to slavery.' 19
Furthermore, to maintain this color-conscious barrier, from 1790
to 1870 the Constitution limited naturalization to whites, and from
1870 to 1906,2o the Constitution limited naturalization to whites and
freed slaves.2' Moreover, the number of Representatives allotted to
each state was determined by the number of "free Persons,"
17. The original intent of the founding fathers was not to include African-Americans as
citizens, as the founding fathers believed that African-Americans were of an "inferior order" for
whom slavery was a "benefit." See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). In his Dred Scott
opinion, Chief Justice Taney addressed the question of whether "a negro, whose ancestors were
imported into this country, and sold as slaves," id. at 403, could become a citizen of the United
States. See id. Taney relied upon original intent analysis to determine that, at the time the
Constitution was adopted, the Framers did not intend blacks to have the potential for
citizenship. See id. at 410-11. Taney held:
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the
language used in the Declaration of Independence, show that neither the class of
persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had
become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be
included in the general words used in that memorable instrument.
Id. at 407.
18. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
19. Id. at 409. Indeed, it is "too clear for dispute," that the Declaration of Independence
itself, when it declared that "all men are created equal," referred to whites and excluded blacks
from the calculus. See id. at 410. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss all of
the Framers' true thoughts on slavery, volumes have been written on Jefferson, his writings, his
actions, and the discrepancies between the two, including JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX,
THE CHARACFER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1997). Although Jefferson did propose the end of
slavery in the new states in 1800, that failed proposal represented the "high water mark of his
anti-slavery efforts, which receded afterward to lower levels ofcaution and procrastination." Id.
at 68 (citation omitted). From the time of the writing of the Declaration until his death,
Jefferson owned an average of 200 slaves, and he died owning 130. See id. at 44, 290.
Furthermore, even when writing theoretically about the end of slavery, Jefferson remained a
believer in segregation. See id. at 147. His views regarding war against the Native Americans
were also far from color-blind, directing the mass deportations of eastern tribes to the West. See
id. at 61-62, 201; see also LEONARD LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER
SlDE (1963); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK (1968).
20. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 192-93 (1922). In Ozawa, the debate was
whether the explicit exclusions of citizenship for blacks and Indians meant that only the
enumerated races were excluded or, rather, that the Framers intended inclusion of whites only.
21. See id.
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46 ,22
"excluding Indians not taxed" and "three fifths of all other persons.
Thus, it is clear that the Framers' original intent was to create a color-
conscious Constitution.
B. The Reconstruction Amendments
With the introduction of the Thirteenth,23 Fourteenth,24 and
Fifteenth Amendments, 25 Congress had the opportunity to make the
Constitution truly color-blind, but chose not to do So.26 Congressman
Thaddeus Stevens offered language of total non-discrimination for
these amendments, but Congress rejected total non-discrimination. 27
The language Congress finally implemented in the amendments was
Congressman Bingham's "equal protection," which ensured the
return of the Slave Codes in the guise of the Black Codes, and the
lengthy reign of the Jim Crow laws. Thus, it is clear that Congress
did not seek a color-blind Constitution.2 8 In addition, when the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to interpret "equal protection" in
the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Black noted that the amendment
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The question was never whether or not slaves would
vote, but, rather, how their existence would impact the distribution of white Congressmen.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
26. For extensive treatment of the drafters' intent for the Reconstruction Amendments, see
KULL, supra note 3, at 53-88.
27. Congressman Thaddeus Stevens proposed the following language (based on the
original ideas of Wendell Philips): "All national and State laws shall be equally applicable to
every citizen and no discrimination shall be made on account of race or color." KULL, supra
note 3, at 73. But Congressman Bingham's counterproposal of "equal protection" carried the
day. See id. at 87.
28. See Laurence Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Color-Blind?
20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 201, 204 (citing Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding
amd the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 56 (1955)) ("[W]e know, with as much
Cortainty as such matters ever permit, that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
thik 'equal protection of the laws' made all racial distinctions in law unconstitutional; they did
mo intend, for example, to outlaw racially segregated public schools.").
Just a few weeks after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed laws
piamrnteeing funds to "colored schools" and granting city lots for their use. See Act of July 23,
366, 14 Stat. 216, cited in KULL, supra note 3, at 258 n.24. Similarly, in Bakke, Justice
daruhall pointed out that the same Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment passed the
'veedman's Bureau Act, 14 Stat. 173 (1866), which was clearly intended to provide race-
oncious relief to former slaves. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 396-97 (concurring in the judgment in part
ad dissenting in part).
1998]
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"came into being primarily to protect Negroes from discrimination,
and while some of its language can and does protect others, all know
that the chief purpose behind it was to protect ex-slaves." 29 Yet it was
the intentional ambiguity of "equal protection" that guaranteed that a
decision such as Plessy v. Ferguson,30 and the doctrine of "separate
but equal," would eventually arrive.3'
C. Plessy v. Ferguson
In Plessy v. Ferguson,32 the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana
law that required segregation of black and white train passengers.
The law at issue in Plessy was, in fact, truly color-blind on its face.
The Louisiana law required that intrastate railroad passengers ride in
train carriages with members of their own race, thus denying theS • 33
pleasures of diversity to African-Americans and whites alike. When
Plessy, seven-eighths white, attempted to sit in the passenger car
reserved for whites, and refused to move to the car "used for the race
to which he belonged," he was ejected from the train and arrested by
the New Orleans police.34 According to the Court, the fact that the
law did not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment was "too clear
for argument., 35 The Court found, however, that scrutiny of the law
29. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 275 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). But ef. City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 559 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
The fact is that Congress's concern in passing the Reconstruction Amendments, and
particularly their congressional authorization provisions, was that States would not
adequately respond to racial violence or discrimination against newly freed slaves. To
interpret any aspect of these Amendments as proscribing state remedial responses to
these very problems turns the Amendments on their heads.
Id.
30. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 401 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("From Plessy to Brown v. Board of Education, ours was a Nation where, by law, an individual
could be given 'special' treatment based on the color of his skin.").
31. Professor Kull argues that, "A rigorous equality before the law ... can be enforced
only by a rule of nondiscrimination; and nondiscrimination can be secured only by requiring it
in terms." KULL, supra note 3, at 66. His conclusions have been amply borne out by the
constitutional law of racial discrimination over the ensuing 125 years.
32. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540. In fact, "(n]either in the information nor plea was
[Plessy's) particular race or color averred." Id. at 541.
34. See id. at 541-42.
35. Id. at 542. Justice Brown held that a law which recognized the color of the two races
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol54/iss1/10
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under the Fourteenth Amendment required greater attention.36 The
Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment did not ban social
distinctions based on race or demand "commingling upon terms
unsatisfactory to either. '37 Justice Brown then delivered the great lie
of Plessy: segregative laws "do not necessarily imply the inferiority
of either race to the other."
38
III. THE STRUGGLE FOR A STANDARD
From Bakke39 to Adarand,4 ° the modem Court has struggled to
articulate the appropriate standard of review for race-based
affirmative measures. The myth of a color-blind Constitution has
always been at the heart of that debate.
A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme
Court held that the University of California at Davis's quota-based
did not destroy their legal equality or reestablish involuntary servitude. See id. at 543.
36. See id. at 543.
37. Id. at 544.
38. Id. Later, Justice Brown added that any such interpretation would be "solely because
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." Id. at 551. Justice Brown supported
his position by noting the constitutionality of separate schools for white and black children and
laws forbidding racial intermarriages. See id. at 544-55.
As noted above, Justice Harlan stated in dissent, "Our Constitution is color-blind and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 3. Yet, earlier in the same paragraph, Justice Harlan suggested that:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty.
Id Furthermore, Justice Harlan stated that, even if the Constitution is color-blind, the Chinese
belong to "a race so different from our own," that they, like the freed slaves of Dred Scott, are
not entitled to citizenship. See id. at 561; cf Laurence Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution
Must the Law Be Color-Blind? 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 201, 203 (1986) ("The race neutralists
always offer the obligatory quotation from Justice Harlan .... "). Tribe notes that, "[l]ike most
Southern gentlemen of the nineteenth century, Justice Harlan-a former slave owner and
originally an opponent of the Thirteenth Amendment-was surely the product of his time." Id.
at 203 n.16.
39. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 256 (1978).
40. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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admissions program was unconstitutional.41 The University of
California at Davis twice turned down Alan Bakke, a white male, for
admission to medical school in the zero-sum battle for one of one
hundred available freshman seats.42 The University rejected Bakke
despite the fact that he possessed better objective scores than a
number of minority students who were admitted under a special
program.43 Bakke's resulting lawsuit confronted the Court with the
issue of whether the school's special admissions program violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
44
41. See 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In the splintered Bakke decision, Justice Powell alone
favored strict scrutiny of race-based affirmative action programs, four Justices favored
intermediate scrutiny, and the other four Justices failed to reach the constitutional issue. See id.
Significantly, Justice Powell stated that Bakke only failed strict scrutiny because it totally
foreclosed some non-minority individuals from admission to the university's medical school.
See id. at 315-20.
42. The University of California at Davis Medical School opened in 1968 with 50
freshman seats, and expanded enrollment to 100 seats in 1971. See 438 U.S. at 272. With no
special admissions program for minority or disadvantaged students, the first class contained
three Asian-Americans, but no other minorities. See id. The faculty created a program over the
next two years to aid "disadvantaged" applicants. See id. A separate admissions committee with
a majority of members from minority groups was formed and pre-screened applicants before
sending them on to the general admissions committee. See id. at 272-75. The special committee
continued to send approved applicants to the general committee until 16 of the 100 seats were
filled (8 when there were only 50 seats). See id. at 275. Although a substantial number of the
special committee applicants were white, only minorities were admitted through the program.
See id at 275-76, n.5.
43. See id. at 276-77. Alan Bakke applied late in 1973 with a composite score too low
(468 on a 500-point scale) to qualify him for admission under the regular program. See id. at
276. Although there were still four special admissions seats open, he was not considered for
them. See id. Bakke complained to the Chairman of the Admissions Committee that the
program was a racial or ethnic quota system. See id. Bakke reapplied in 1974, and, although he
was interviewed by and received a low score from the Chairman to whom he had previously
complained, he received a score of 549 on a scale of 600. See id. at 277. He was again rejected,
although, as was the case the prior year, his scores were significantly higher than those ofsome
special admitees. See id.
44. See id. at 277-78. Bakke filed suit with the Superior Court of California seeking
mandatory injunctive and declaratory relief compelling his admission to the school, arguing that
the University was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the California Constitution, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1964). See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277-78. The trial court found that the admissions procedure was
a racial quota and violated the federal Constitution, the California Constitution, and Title VI,
but the court did not order Bakke's admission, holding that he had not shown that he would
have been admitted but for the quota. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279.
Upon cross-appeal, the Supreme Court of California took the case directly from the trial
court. See 553 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Cal. 1976). Basing its decision on the federal Equal Protection
Clause, the California court agreed that the admissions program was a racial quota system,
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Justice Powell, writing for a divided Court, stated that the
University of California at Davis's admissions policy created a
distinction drawn on racial or ethnic lines and, therefore, must be
subjected to "the most rigid scrutiny"45 or "the most exacting judicial
examination."" Justice Powell began his Constitutional
examination 47 by discussing the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose of
facilitating "freedom of the slave race.' 48 Powell stated that while the
landmark race cases "could be characterized as involving
discrimination by the 'majority' white race against the Negro
minority,"49 the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause eventually
had come to be extended to all persons.5
Accordingly, the Court rejected the Medical School's argument
that "benign" discrimination against whites is entitled to a lesser
standard of scrutiny than when the white majority discriminates
applied strict scrutiny, and, although it found compelling state interests for the program, judged
the program not to be the least intrusive way to achieve those goals. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279;
see also 553 P.2d at 1162-66.
45. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944)).
46. Id. However, Powell stated, "It]hat is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional." Id.
47. Justice Powell first held that the medical school's admissions program did not violate
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Powell spent little time on the question of
whether the admissions program represented a "goal" or a "quota." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 285-86.
Although the issue was not initially briefed by the parties, the Court requested supplemental
briefs on the Title VII issue, so as not to preclude the possibility that the case could be decided
on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. See id. at 281. The Court assumed for the
purposes of Bakke that there is a private right of action under Title VI. See id. at 284. Justice
Powell stated that, although there were some indications from the legislative history that
Congress intended Title VI to be a color-blind prohibition on discrimination, Title VI proscribes
"only" those racial classifications that violate equal protection. See id. at 287. Thus, implicit in
this argument is Powell's understanding that the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment is
something less than color-blind non-discrimination. See id. at 286-89. Title VI's legislative
history revealed a legislative intent to halt federal funding of institutions that "violate a
prohibition of racial discrimination similar to that of the Constitution." Id. at 284. Furthermore,
"although isolated statements of various legislators taken out of context can be marshaled in
support of the proposition that § 601 enacted a purely color-blind scheme," id., Justice Powell
found that a closer reading intended the lesser standard of constitutional equal protection. See
id at 285-87. Implicit in Justice Powell's statement is a key component of this Article's
argument-an assumption that equal protection means less than non-discrimination.
48. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36,71 (1873)).
49. Id. at 294.
50. See id. at 292. But Justice Powell cited exclusively in this passage to cases offering
equal protection to victimized minorities: Irish, Chinese, Japanese, and Mexican-Americans.
See i.
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
168 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 54:157
against minorities.5t The Court found that of the four justifications
the Medical School offered for its race-based admissions policy,
52
only the goal of attaining a diverse student body was compelling.
53
After finding the diversity interest to be compelling, the Court turned
to the question of whether the Medical School's race-based
admissions program was necessary to achieve its goal of a diverse
student body. The Court found that the University's program failed to
withstand strict scrutiny because race was the sole criterion the
University used in its search for a diverse student body.
5 4
Nonetheless, Justice Powell clearly indicated that race may be a
"plus" factor in admissions decisions, and cited with approval two
university admissions programs using race as a factor.55 Thus,
according to Justice Powell, an admissions program that uses race
merely as a "plus" will withstand even strict scrutiny.
56
51. See id. at 294-95.
52. See id. at 306-11. Justice Powell stated that preferring the members of a group solely
for their race or ethnicity is constitutionally impermissible. See id. at 307. The Court has
allowed such classification at the expense of innocent individuals only when there has been a
statutory or constitutional violation. See id. Justice Powell found that the Medical School had
failed to prove its contention that minority doctors would serve underserviced minority
communities. See id. at 3 10. Furthermore, Justice Powell stated that there are better criteria than
race to use in identifying willingness to practice medicine in minority communities. See id. at
310-11.
53. See id. at 311-12. Powell stated:
This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has
been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university
to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.
Id. Justice Powell found support for this proposition in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634
(1950). See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313-14.
54. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-15.
55. See id. at 316-17. Justice Powell cited to Harvard's admissions program in which
"race has been a factor in some admissions decisions." Id. at 316 (citing amici curiae brief for
Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University and the University of
Pennsylvania at 2-3). Powell also referenced Princeton University's admissions program in
which "race can be helpful information in enabling the admission officer to understand more
fully what a particular candidate has accomplished-and against what odds." Id. at 317, n.51
(citing Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY, Sept. 26,
1977, at 7, 9). Thus, Justice Powell stated, "[ln such an admissions program [as Harvard's],
race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not
insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats." Id. at
317 (footnote omitted).
56. See id.
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Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part, asserted that the "central meaning" of Bakke was that
"government may take race into account when it acts not to demean
or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on
minorities by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings
have been made by judicial, legislative or administrative bodies with
competence to act in this area.",57 Justice Brennan found that, in light
of the history of discrimination in the United States, color-blind
remedies would not effectively remedy segregation. 8 Brennan found
that remedying the effects of past societal discrimination was
substantially related to the achievement of important governmental
objectives.59 Brennan noted that past discrimination had resulted in a
predominantly white medical community in the United States.6° More
importantly, the lingering effects of past discrimination still acted as
a handicap to African-American medical school applicants. 61 Justice
57. Id. at 325.
58. See id. at 327 ("Against this background, claims that law must be color-blind or that
the datum of race is no longer relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than as
a description of reality."). Note that Brennan would allow race-based measures to remedy
societal discrimination, as opposed to discrimination by the specific governmental actor
applying the remedy:
This is not to denigrate aspiration; for reality rebukes us that race has too often been
used by those who would stigmatize and oppress minorities. Yet we cannot-and, as
we shall demonstrate, need not under our Constitution or Title VI, which merely
extends the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment to private parties who receive
federal funds-let color blindness become myopia which masks the reality that many
"created equal" have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and
by their fellow citizens.
Id. at 327.
59. See id. at 259, 362. It is important that Justice Brennan focused on societal
discrimination rather than discrimination particular to the state actor seeking to impose a race-
based remedial measure, because the latter analysis, when coupled with the strict scrutiny
standard now utilized for all race-based measures, raises the standard near-if not beyond-the
fatal-in-fact standard of Podberesky and Hopwood.
60. See id. at 369-70.
61. See id. at 372. Brennan opined that:
[T]he conclusion is inescapable that applicants to medical school must be few indeed
who endured the effects of de jure segregation, the resistance of Brown I, or the
equally debilitating pervasive private discrimination fostered by our long history of
official discrimination and yet come to the starting line with an education equal to
whites.
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Brennan found that the Medical School's program did not stigmatize
any group, that race was reasonably used in light of the program's
objectives,62 and that it only gave preferences to minority applicants
that had faced disadvantages. Finally, he noted that the program
was not violative of the Constitution just because there was a set-
aside for a predetermined number of students, rather than the use of
race as a mere "factor." 64 Justice Brennan opined that, for
constitutional purposes, there is no difference between the two
approaches.65  Thus, Justice Brennan would have upheld the
University's admission policies as constitutional.66
In Bakke, Justice Marshall's opinion began by stating the central
hypocrisy of the color-blindness argument:
For it must be remembered that, during most of the past 200
years, the Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not
prohibit the most ingenious and pervasive forms of
discrimination against the Negro. Now, when a State acts to
remedy the effects of that legacy of discrimination, I cannot
believe that this same Constitution stands as a barrier.
67
Justice Marshall cataloged the history of racial discrimination
against African-Americans in America 8 and concluded that, "[t]he
62. See id. at 373-74.
63. See id. at 377. Brennan stated that other minority applicants who were not
disadvantaged would have to gain acceptance through the regular admissions program. See id.
64. Id. at 378. Justice Brennan avoided the use of the word "quota" here. Had Brennan
been able to convince Justice Powell that the program as administered did not constitute an
impermissible quota, it appears he could have marshaled a five-justice majority.
65. See id. at 379.
66. See id. at 378.
67. Id. at 387 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, "it is
more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of class-based discrimination against
Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a class-based remedy for that discrimination is
permissible." Id. at 400.
68. See id. at 388-94. Justice Marshall began with the Southern delegation's demand that
Thomas Jefferson remove passages from the Declaration of Independence criticizing the King
of England for participation in the slave trade. See id. at 388. Marshall stated, "The implicit
protection of slavery embodied in the Declaration of Independence was made explicit in the
Constitution .... Id. at 389. Marshall then examined the Court's opinion in Dred Scott, and
detailed the initial failure of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to protect
African-Americans. See id. at 389-94. Marshall noted that "[b]y narrow and ingenious
interpretation [the Supreme Court's] decisions over a period of years had whittled away a great
part of the authority presumably given the government for protection of civil rights." Id. at 391.
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position of the Negro today in America is the tragic but inevitable
consequence of centuries of unequal treatment. Measured by any
benchmark of comfort or achievement, meaningful equality remains a
distant dream for the Negro." 69 In light of the nation's history of
discrimination, Justice Marshall would have held race-based remedial
measures to be a state interest "of the highest order.,
70
Similarly, Justice Blackmun's opinion noted the small number of
African-American professionals in the United States during the
1970S71 and agreed that affirmative action programs would one day
be rendered unnecessary.72 Blackmun argued that many highly
qualified applicants were denied admission to medical school,73 and
that outside the context of race, admissions decisions were already
being made on the basis of preferences. 74 Furthermore, Blackmun
argued that admissions decisions are within the competence of
educational institutions, not courts.7 5 Finally, Blackmun noted that
the Fourteenth Amendment, although enlarged in its scope of
application, had not "broken away from its moorings and its original
intended purposes," which remain the protection of African-
Americans from discrimination.76 As a result, Blackmun opined that
"real world" race-based measures were currently necessary to combat
racism. 77 He agreed with justice Marshall that Davis's admissions
program met the constitutional criteria.
B. Fullilove v. Klutznick
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,78 the Supreme Court struggled with the
proper test to apply to a flexible, congressionally-created affirmative
69. Id. at 395.
70. Id. at 396.
71. See id. at 403 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Blackmun noted that less than 2% of physicians, attorneys, and medical and law students were
minorities.
72. See id. at 403.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 404.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 405.
77. See id. at 403.
78. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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action program that, unlike the program in Bakke, did not involve a
quota.79 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality of three,
explicitly stated that nothing requires Congress to act in a color-blind
fashion.80 While Chief Justice Burger did not delineate the applicable
standard of review, he held that the federal minority business
enterprise program at issue in Fullilove would pass either the strict
scrutiny standard or the intermediate scrutiny standard.8' Chief
Justice Burger noted that the Court grants paramount deference to the
opinions of Congress. 82 It is important to note that the Court
examines education cases differently than it examines cases involving
federal statutes. Therefore, the standard of review the Court applied
79. "The MBE program does not mandate the allocation of federal funds according to
inflexible percentages solely based on race or ethnicity." Id. at 473. Fullilove's fact pattern was
similar to that which the Court would face fifteen years later in Adarand. See id. at 473. The
Public Works Employment Act of 1977 required that 10% of federal grants for local works
projects be used to buy goods or services from "minority business enterprises" (MBEs). The
statute defined an MBE as a business owned at least 50% (51% in the case of publicly owned
businesses) by people who are "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and
Aleuts." Id. at 454 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6705(F)(2) (Supp. II 1976). Congress adopted the plan
because, although there were qualified minority businesses available to do public works
projects, they accounted for an "inordinately small percentage of government contracting
[because of].... the longstanding existence and maintenance of barriers impairing access by
minority enterprises to public contracting opportunities .... Id. at 463.
80. See id. at 482 ("As a threshold matter, we reject the contention that in the remedial
context the Congress must act in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion." (citing Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971))).
81. See id. at 492. Justice Burger's opinion, however, relied upon the fact that the Court
was reviewing an Act of Congress, stating, "[h]ere we are not dealing with a remedial decree of
a court but with the legislative authority of Congress." Id. at 480.
82. See id.
83. See Fulilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring). In addition to the majority
opinion, three Justices wrote a concurring opinion in which they applied intermediate scrutiny
and found the plan constitutional. The Justices differed on Bakke's effect on the holding, with
Chief Justice Burger disavowing any reliance thereon, stating, "This opinion does not adopt,
either expressly or implicitly, the formulas or analysis articulated in such cases as [Bakke]." Id.
at 492 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Justice Powell applied the same strict scrutiny standard for
which he was the sole advocate in Bakke, but found that the measure in Fullilove was
nonetheless justified as serving the compelling interest of eradicating the effects of past wrongs.
See id. at 496. Justice Marshall (with whom Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined) reiterated
his opinion from Bakke that racial classifications which provide benefits to minorities in order
to remedy the effects of past discrimination are appropriate. See id. at 517-18 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
In contrast, Justice Stewart's dissent, in which Justice Rehnquist joined, argued for a color-
blind application of the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Stewart stated that the Framers of the
Constitution "set out to establish a society that recognized no distinctions among white men on
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in Fullilove may not transfer well into affirmative action cases
involving education.
C. United States v. Paradise
In United States v. Paradise,84 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a temporary one-black-for-one-white
promotion scheme for Alabama state troopers. The district court
ordered the color-conscious promotion scheme after finding that the
Alabama Department of Public Safety had engaged in blatant racial
discrimination for nearly four decades and had blatantly resisted
court-ordered desegregation for more than a decade.8 6 While the
account of their birth." Id. at 531 n. 13 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Rather than
finding color-blindness in the original document, Justice Stewart found the "seeds" of color-
blindness in Jefferson's Declaration of Independence. See id.
Justice Stevens's dissent ranged from 18th century France to Nazi Germany to find reasons
why the preference for MBEs was unconstitutional. See id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens analogized the harms possible when characterizing on the basis of race with the
economic consequences of using noble birth as a basis for classification in Eighteenth Century
France and the Citizenship Law of Nazi Germany and its complex definition of a "Jew." See id.
at 533, 534 n.5. However, to argue equality between the Public Works Employment Act's less-
than-perfect definition of the ethnic groups considered in determining MBE status with Nazi
Germany's determination of who should be considered a Jew for extermination purposes is a
sadly inadequate analogy. Indeed, it would be confusing a "fit of spite" for a "Kulturkampf," to
paraphrase Justice Scalia. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
In what appears to be an attack on Fullilove's lack of narrow tailoring, Justice Stevens
argued that discrimination against African-Americans cannot justify discrimination against
Eskimos and Indians who "had an opportunity to exploit America's resources before the
ancestors of most American citizens arrived." Id. at 538. He also noted that those who speak
Spanish came voluntarily, often "without invitation," Id. at 538, and that the Aleuts were
"ruthlessly exploited" by the Russians. See id. at 538 n.8.
84. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
85. See id. at 153.
86. See id. In 1972, a district court found that, in thirty-seven years, there had never been
an African-American Alabama state trooper. See id. at 154. In 1979, the court found that none
of the 232 troopers with a rank of corporal or higher were African-American. See id. Only after
eleven years of local failure to act did the district court order the remedy of one-for-one
promotions. See id.
Although facially strict, the one-for-one requirement contained a number of mitigating
provisions. First, the requirement would be terminated when 25% of the troopers were African-
American. See id. at 154-55. Second, the requirement could be waived if no qualified African-
Americans were available for existing openings. See id. at 177. Third, the provision did not
require the layoff or firing of any whites. See id. at 182. Finally, the requirement would be
dropped as soon as the Alabama Department of Public Safety put forth a nondiscriminatory
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Supreme Court did not specify the appropriate level of scrutiny,
Justice Brennan stated that the district court's plan would pass even
strict scrutiny.87 The Court held that the scheme would survive even
the highest level of scrutiny because the district court's plan was
narrowly tailored and served a compelling governmental interest.88
The Court noted that remedying past and present discrimination by a
state actor is unquestionably a compelling governmental interest.89
However, in her dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that "the Court
adopts a standardless view of 'narrowly tailored' far less stringent
than that required by strict scrutiny." 90 Justice O'Connor argued that
a "rigid quota" could not be considered narrowly tailored because
there was no evidence that it was necessary to erase the effects of the
Department's delay.91 Justice O'Connor also found that more benign
alternatives were available.92 Moreover, Justice O'Connor would
have required the district court to articulate its reasons for rejecting
the more benign alternatives.93
D. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
In City of Richmond v. . Croson,94 the Supreme court held that
the City of Richmond's Minority Business Utilization Plan (the
"Plan") was unconstitutional.95 Richmond had designed the Plan in
1983 to increase business among Minority Business Enterprises
hiring and promotion procedure, as had been ordered in 1972. See id. at 178.
87. See id at 166-67.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 197 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined
in the dissent. African-American troopers still find vestiges of racism in the system today. See
Gita M. Smith, Blacks See Slow Gains Since '87 Court Victory, ATLANTA J. & CoNsT., Feb.
25, 1997, at B1. Leon Hampton, who became the first African-American Alabama state trooper
in 1972, argues that percentage gains by African-Americans have more to do with an overall
reduction in force than with African-American promotions. See id. Although a consent decree
required that there be 30% African-American participation among new recruits, the last two
new classes only contained 8% African-Americans.
91. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 187. Apparently, even a 37-year delay could not justify a
temporary "quota."
92. See id. at 198-99.
93. See id. at 199-200.
94. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
95. Seeid. at511.
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("MBEs"). 96 In holding the Plan unconstitutional, the Court noted the
Plan was not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of past
discrimination,97 and that the city had failed to demonstrate a
compelling governmental interest.98 The Court also noted that
Richmond had not been even a "passive participant" in the system of
racial exclusion in the local construction industry.99
The Court further noted that Richmond had failed to attempt race-
neutral alternatives before enacting the Plan.' t° The Court also stated
that the Plan failed the narrow-tailoring test because it was unrealistic
to assume that minorities would choose the construction trade in
proportion to their numbers in the population. 10 1 In other words, the
city had no reason to expect that its Plan would successfully remedy
the past effects of discrimination in the construction industry.
10 2
Finding that the city failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental
interest for the Plan, Justice O'Connor reiterated that affirmative
action programs, unless "strictly reserved for remedial settings,"
"promote notions of racial inferiority" and create racial hostility.1'
The Court found that the construction industry in Richmond was not
such a remedial setting, and, thus, the city was wrong in relying on
general findings of discrimination in the entire construction
96. See id. at 478. Richmond, with an African-American population of 50%, had awarded
only 0.67% of its contracts to minorities between 1978 and 1983 and had virtually no minority
members in its contractors' associations. See id. at 479-80.
97. See id. at 507-08.
98. See id. at 505.
99. See id. at 492.
100. See id. at 507. O'Connor did not explain why Richmond could not conclude, based on
the federal attempts at race-neutral measures, that race-neutral alternatives would also be futile
at the local level.
101. See id. at 507-08 (citing Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that members of a race will not
gravitate to a given profession proportionately with "mathematical exactitude").
102. See id.
103. Id. at 493. Justice O'Connor then turned to an aspect of the case that was novel before
the Court, noting that one of the justifications for allowing a less stringent standard than strict
scrutiny in the case of "benign" racial classifications is that they represent a choice by the
dominant majority to act against their own self-interest. See id. at 495. Richmond's nine-seat
City Council, which adopted the Plan, had a five person African-American majority. See id. But
the vote was not made purely along racial lines. See id. at 555 (Marshall, J., dissenting). One of
the white councilmen voted in favor of the Plan, one abstained, and two voted against it. See id.
Furthermore, in recent years, the white and African-American members of the council had
"increasingly joined hands on controversial matters." Id. at 554.
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industry.1 4 Reliance on the generalized assertion that there had been
past discrimination in an entire industry gave Richmond no guidance
as to how to determine the "precise scope of the injury it [sought] to
remedy."
I0 5
104. See id. at 498. The relevant number of African-Americans was, to Justice O'Connor,
not the 50% African-American population of Richmond, but, rather, the pool of qualified MBE
contractors. See id. at 501-02. O'Connor stated, "Blacks may be disproportionately attracted to
industries other than construction." Id. at 503. O'Connor concluded that "in sum, none of the
evidence presented by the city points to any identified discrimination in the Richmond
construction industry." Id. at 505. Therefore, there was no compelling state interest. See id.
105. Id. at 505. In an opinion in which he concurred in part and concurred in the judgment,
Justice Stevens disagreed with O'Connor's position that racial classifications are only
permissible as a remedy for past wrongs. See id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens referred to his Wygant dissent in which he stated
that, "even if we completely disregard our history of racial injustice, race is not always
irrelevant in sound governmental decisionmaking." Id. at 512 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313-
15). However, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice O'Connor that the Plan benefited persons
who were not victims of discrimination and that the Plan imposed a stigma on its beneficiaries.
See id. at 515-16.
Justice Kennedy also concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, concluding that,
although "the moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection
Clause," racial preferences should not be automatically invalid. Id. at 518-19 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia, who concurred only in the judgment, would have gone beyond Justice
O'Connor to hold that state and local governments may never discriminate on the basis of race
to remedy the effects of past discrimination. See id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). Later, Justice Scalia stated that a State could use race to undo the effects of its own
unlawful racial classification, such as giving raises to minority employees after it had denied
them raises on the basis of race in the past. See id. at 524. Scalia concluded:
Racial preferences appear to "even the score" (in some small degree) only if one
embraces the proposition that our society is appropriately viewed as divided into races,
making it right that an injustice rendered in the past to a black man should be
compensated for by discriminating against a white. Nothing is worth that embrace.
Id at 528.
Justice Marshall, writing for himself and Justices Brennan and Blackmun, found "deep
irony" in the fact that the majority had second guessed the City of Richmond's judgment on the
issue of past discrimination in its construction industry. See id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The majority did so despite the fact that "a century of decisions by this and other federal courts
has richly documented the city's disgraceful history of public and private racial discrimination."
Id. Marshall stated that failure to see this discrimination "blinks credibility," id. at 541, and
"does violence" to the principles of comity in the federal system. See id. at 543-44. Cases in
which the city's discriminatory past was revealed included Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S.
358 (1975), in which the city attempted to annex white majority county land in order to
maintain white political control when the racial composition of the city approached 50%, and
Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 412 U.S. 92 (1973), in which the Court reviewed
Richmond's inadequate compliance with Brown v. Board of Education. Moreover, Marshall's
opinion suggested that the city was well aware of the nationwide information on racial
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E. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,10 6 in what can be described
as Justice Brennan's last stand,10 7 a five-Justice majority held that
"benign" race-based classifications enacted by Congress must be
subjected to intermediate scrutiny 0 8 The Court stated that
classifications would withstand such scrutiny if they did not "impose
undue burdens on non-minorities."' 0 9 At issue in Metro Broadcasting
were two FCC policies."10 The policies favored minority"' owned
businesses applying for radio and television broadcast licenses.112 In
upholding the policies, Justice Brennan took pains to detail the lack
of minority ownership of radio and television stations' 3 and to note
that the FCC only adopted race-conscious methods of achieving
diversity after other methods had been tried and failed
1 4
Holding that the Court's prior decision in Fullilove"5 supported
less than strict scrutiny in the constitutional analysis of
discrimination in the construction industry that Congress had gathered prior to adopting the
MBE set-aside. See id. at 533-34. Justice Marshall found two compelling state interests:
eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination and preventing the city's own spending from
perpetuating the discriminatory pattern established in the past. Id. at 536-37.
Finally, Justice Marshall found the MBE plan to be narrowly tailored. See id. at 548. He took
issue with the Court's decision to apply strict scrutiny to a race-conscious remedial measure
because "discrimination against blacks and other racial minorities in this Nation has pervaded
our Nation's history and continues to scar our society." Id. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). For a critical race theorist's
critique of Metro Broadcasting, see Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC:
Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1990).
107. This was Brennan's last opinion before retiring. He was replaced by President Bush's
nominee David Souter and then saw his Metro Broadcasting opinion overruled in Adarand.
108. See 497 U.S. at 596-97.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 552. First, the program awarded "enhancement' for minority status in the
competitive application process for new licenses, and, second, the program required that certain
"distress sale" transfers of existing radio and television stations be made only to minorities. See
id.
111. Minorities were defined by the FCC as "Black, Hispanic Surnamed, American
Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian and Asiatic American extraction." Id. at 553 n.1.
112. Seeid. at556-58.
113. Although in 1986 minorities made up at least 20% of the population, they owned only
2.1% of the 11,000 radio and television stations in the United States. See id. at 553.
114. See id. at 554-56. The FCC had evaluated its policies and attempted other solutions in
1969, 1971, and 1978. See id at 554 n.3, 555-56.
115. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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congressionally mandated race-based programs,' 1 6 Justice Brennan
announced a more flexible standard:
We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by
Congress-even if those measures are not "remedial" in the
sense of being designed to compensate victims of past
governmental or societal discrimination-are constitutionally
permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are
substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 17
Justice Brennan held that Congress's interest in enhancing broadcast
diversity was "at the very least, an important governmental
objective"1 8 in the context of radio and television programming." 9
Such an interest was sufficient to uphold the FCC's minority
ownership policies.12
0
116. Justice Brennan held that Fullilove stood for the proposition that all congressionally
mandated programs were entitled to a greater degree of deference than that provided by strict
scrutiny, rather than just those congressional programs enacted pursuant to section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563.
117. Id. at 564-65 (footnotes omitted).
118. Id.at567.
119. The beneficiaries of this diversity were not only the minority groups given access to
the airwaves, but also the members of the viewing and listening audiences. See id. at 568.
120. See id. Justice O'Connor would have applied strict scrutiny to Metro Broadcasting,
arguing that Fullilove's holding depended on Congress's unique powers under section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 606-07 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). To Justice O'Connor,
'Benign' racial classification is a contradiction in terms," id. at 609, and the Court misplaced
confidence in its own ability to distinguish between good and bad governmental uses of race.
See id. The Court's Metro Broadcasting decision attracted a great deal of critical commentary.
See, e.g., Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104
HARv. L. REV. 107 (1990). Professor Fried, then United States Solicitor General, authorized the
amicus curiae briefs of the United States in Metro Broadcasting, and was the principal
signatory of the government briefs in Croson and Wygant. See id. at 107. To Professor Fried,
"the Court turned away from its past understandings" in Metro Broadcasting by applying
intermediate scrutiny, id. at 113, and thereby introduced "uncertainty and instability into the
law." Id. at 123.
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IV. THE COURTS Go COLOR-BLIND
A. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,12 1 the Court overruled its
decision in Metro Broadcasting122 and held that race-based
classifications are constitutional only if they are "narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests.' 23  The
Court's holding in Adrand thus resolved all existing ambiguities by
making strict scrutiny the standard of review for all race-based
programs. Hence, strict scrutiny applies to a raced-based program
regardless of whether the program is state or federal, and regardless
of whether it benefits the racial majority or minority. 124
In Adarand, Adarand Constructors, Inc. sued the federal
government when congressionally created preferences resulted in the
award of a guardrail subcontract to the minority-owned Gonzales
Construction Company. 25 Gonzales was awarded the project despite
the fact that Adarand had submitted the lowest bid for the project. 126
121. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). The case has already generated a good deal of commentary. See,
e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Podberesky, Hopwood and Adarand: Implications for the Future of Race-
Based Programs, 16 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 287 (1996); Brain C. Eades, casenote, The United States
Supreme Court Goes Color-Blind: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv.
771 (1996); Margaret A. Sewell, Note, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: The Armageddon of
Affirmative Action, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 611 (1997) (arguing that Adarand was wrongly decided
and that Justice O'Connor's majority opinion created a new level of scrutiny between
traditional strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny).
122. See 515 U.S. at 227.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. Seeid.at205.
126. See id. The prime contractor, Mountain Gravel & Construction Company, received
additional compensation if it hired subcontractors certified as small businesses controlled by
"socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." Id. Gonzales was certified; Adarand
was not. See id. Mountain Gravel would not have chosen Gonzales but for the additional
compensation. See id. Under the relevant statutory provision, social and economic disadvantage
could be manifest in a person of any race, but the contractor was allowed to presume such
disadvantage in the case of African American, Hispanic American, Native American, Asian
Pacific Americans and other minorities. See id. (citing section 8(a) of the Small Business Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 637(d)(2X3) (1994)). The Act defines "socially disadvantaged individuals" as
those individuals who are subject to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias, and defines
"economically disadvantaged individuals" as those individuals who are socially disadvantaged
individuals with a diminished ability to compete in the free enterprise system. See id. at 206
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5), (a)(6)(A)).
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Adarand Constructors argued that the government's use of race-based
presumptions in their project award process violated the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. 127
The parties agreed that some degree of heightened scrutiny was
appropriate. 128 They disagreed, however, on exactly what level of
heightened scrutiny the Court should apply.129 Because the case was
brought under the Fifth Amendment, the Court first re-examined the
differing levels of scrutiny it had applied under the Fifth Amendment
and the Fourteenth Amendment.l13 The Court ultimately found that
the levels of scrutiny it applied to the two Amendments were
indistinguishable.13 ' Thus, the Court found that the same level of
The compensation provision at issue in Adarand was one of a number of provisions
designed to provide such individuals with not less than 5% of subcontracts. See 1d. at 206
(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 637(a)(5), (d)(3)(C), 644(g)(1)). However, non-minorities could prove
disadvantaged status on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence," and the presumption of
disadvantage enjoyed by minorities could be rebutted by third persons. See id. at 207-08 (citing
13 C.F.Rt §§ 124.105(e), 124.111(c)-(d), 124.601-124.609 (1994)). The contract at issue was
also covered by the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987,
which required that not less than 10% of funds go to disadvantaged individuals. See id. at 208
(citing Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 106, 101 Stat. 132, 145-56 (1987). This Act included the race-
based presumptions and added women to the group entitled to a presumption of disadvantaged
status. See § 106(c)(2)(B), 101 Stat. at 146. As with the Small Business Act, the presumption of
disadvantage could also be rebutted by third persons. See 49 C.F.R. § 23.69 (1994).
127. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204. The district court granted the government's motion for
summary judgment. See id. at 210 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp.
240 (D. Colo. 1992)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. See
id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994)). The Circuit
Court read Fulliove as having adopted "a lenient standard, resembling intermediate scrutiny in
assessing" federal race-based measures, and further held that Metro Broadcasting had refined
this lenient standard. 515 U.S. at 210 (citing 16 F.3d at 1544-47). Adarand sought declaratory
and injunctive relief against any future use of the race-based presumptions. See id. at 210. The
Supreme Court held that Adarand had standing to seek such relief because Adarand would bid
on other government contracts in the relatively near future, and would likely have to compete
against "small disadvantaged businesses." Id. at 211-12.
128. Seeid. at213.
129. See id.
130. See id. The Court stated that "[o]ur cases have accorded varying degrees of
significance to the differences in the language of those two clauses. We think it necessary to
revisit the issue here." Id. at 213.
131. See id. at 217. Justice O'Connor's analysis began with the Court's early rejection of
an equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. See 1d. at 214 (citing, inter alia,
LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921) ("The Fifth Amendment has no
equal protection clause.")). However, Justice O'Connor stated that the Court "explicitly
questioned" the difference between the federal government's obligations under the Fifth and
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scrutiny applies to actions undertaken by state governments and the
federal government.13
2
Having found that the federal government's equal protection
obligations are the same as those of the states, Justice O'Connor
turned to the heart of the case-whether race-based governmental
actions should be subjected to strict scrutiny when benefitting
historically disadvantaged groups.133 After examining the Court's
fractured decisions in Bakke,134 Fullilove,135 Wygant,136 Paradise, 3 7
and J.A. Croson,138 O'Connor gleaned three principles the Court
should look to: (1) "skepticism" of any race-based preference, (2)
"consistency"' 139 of review regardless of the race benefited or
burdened, and (3) "congruence" between the equal protection
guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
1 40
In light of these principles, Justice O'Connor stated that the
Fourteenth Amendments in 1954, see id. at 217 (citing Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)),
and ultimately came to hold that "[t]his Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection
claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment."' Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)).
132. See 515 U.S. at 217 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)).
133. Seeid.
134. See id. at 218 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). Justice O'Connor noted that Bakke
yielded no majority opinion, but that Justice Powell, author of the judgment, would have
applied strict scrutiny. See id. (citing 438 U.S. at 291). Four other Justices in Bakke advocated
an intermediate level of scrutiny. See id. (citing 438 U.S. at 359).
135. See id. at 219 (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)). Justice O'Connor noted that this
first test of federal race-based affirmative action adopted none of the Bakke proposals, but,
rather, the two-part test of whether the objectives were within the scope of Congress's power
and whether the means to achieving those objectives were constitutionally permissible. See id.
(citing 438 U.S. at 473,492).
136. See id. at 220 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)). In
Wygant, which involved the actions of a local school board, Justice Powell held that strict
scrutiny must be applied regardless of the race of the benefited or burdened individuals. See id.
at 220 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74).
137. See id. at 221 (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987)).
138. See id. (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)). Justice O'Connor
stated that uncertainty as to the proper analysis of race-based remedial affirmative action was
resolved "at least in part" in Croson. Id. at 221-22 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94)
(" [T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of
those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.
139. One aspect of the Court's affirmative action decisions is remarkably consistent: every
action has been brought before the Court by a white individual. See David A. Strauss, The Myth
of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99. But note that if the Court had granted certiorari in
Podberesky, this string would have been broken, as Mr. Podberesky is Hispanic.
140. SeeAdarand, 515 U.S. at223-24.
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Court's Metro Broadcasting decision was a "surprising turn."'
141
Justice O'Connor found Metro Broadcasting to have ignored the
Court's precedent 142 and, thus, pronounced it overruled. 43 Justice
O'Connor found that there was appropriate justification for this
departure from stare decisis'44 and proceeded to overrule Fullilove as
well. 145 The Court then vacated the appellate court's judgment in
Adarand, and remanded the case to the district court.146 The district
court was thus instructed to determine whether the Government's use
of subcontractor compensation clauses could survive strict
scrutiny.
147
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but declined to join in
Part III-C of Justice O'Connor's majority opinion because of his
belief that racial preferences can never survive strict scrutiny. 148 He
stated that "government can never have a 'compelling interest' in
141. Id at 225.
142. See id. at 226. Metro Broadcasting "turned its back" on Croson's holding in applying
intermediate scrutiny to the "benign" racial classification at issue and "squarely rejected" the
congruence between Court analysis of state and federal race-based measures. See id.
143. See id. at 227.
144. See id. at 231-32. Justice O'Connor held that the approach of prior case law was
"intrinsically sounder" than the departure that Metro Broadcasting represented. See id. at 231
(citing Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)). Furthermore, Justice O'Connor opined
that following Metro Broadcasting would "simply compound the recent error ..... Id. at 231.
This reasoning provided the "special justification" needed to depart from the doctrine of
stare decisis. See id. (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)); cf. George S. Swan,
The Political Economy of State Democracy: Romer v. Evans, 7 SErON HALL CONST. L. J. 1, 32
n.229 (noting Justice Scalia "mocking his fellow Justices [in Romer] for ... ignoring
inconvenient precedent"). But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (attacking the Court's departure from precedent "to suit current fashion").
145. See id. at 235 ("to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal racial classifications to
be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is no longer controlling").
146. See id. at 239.
147. Seeid.at238.
148. See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, for Justice Scalia, strict scrutiny would
indeed be fatal in fact.
Justice Ginsburg did not agree with Justice Scalia that the law does not differentiate
between races. See id. at 271 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). For Justice Ginsburg, the irony of
Justice Scalia's claim that "we are just one race' was apparent in the fact that the present
effects of past discrimination exist today because our lawmakers and judges have not been
color-blind for generations. See id. at 272 (quoting 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
Justice Ginsburg did agree with Justice Scalia that the Court's articulated standard was
fatal in fact: "But [Justice O'Connor's] opinion's elaboration strongly suggests that the strict
standard announced is indeed "fatal" for classifications burdening groups that have suffered
discrimination in our society." Id. at 275.
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discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past
racial discrimination in the opposite direction."'149 Justice Thomas
also concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to emphasize his
belief that there is not a "racial paternalism exception to the principle
of equal protection."' 50 Thus, like Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas also
would not allow any distinctions based upon race.
151
B. Podberesky v. Kirwan
In Podberesky v. Kirwan,152 the Fourth Circuit was faced with the
issue of whether the University of Maryland at College Park's
voluntarily established Banneker scholarship program for African-
Americans could survive strict scrutiny. 153 The University argued,
149. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring).
151. See id. In a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice
O'Connor's skepticism toward race-based laws but was critical of her desire for consistency of
analysis in all situations. See id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens saw what O'Connor
did not: the lack of"moral or constitutional equivalence" between "a decision by the majority to
impose a special burden on the members of a minority race and a decision by the majority to
provide a benefit to certain members of that minority notwithstanding its incidental burden on
some members of the majority." Id. Thus, Stevens recognized the difference "between a 'No
Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat" Id. at 245. Justice Stevens was also critical of
O'Connor's use of congruence to find an equivalence between action of the United States
Congress and states or municipalities. See id. at 249-50.
Justice Stevens also stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment directly empowers Congress at the same time that it
expressly limits the states. This is no accident. It represents our Nation's consensus,
achieved after hard experience throughout our sorry history of race relations, that the
Federal Government must be the primary defender of racial minorities against the
states, some ofwhich may be inclined to oppress such minorities.
Id. at 250 (footnote omitted). Stevens was equally critical of the majority's dismissal of the
Court's precedent in its willingness to explicitly overrule Metro Broadcasting and in
undermining Fullilove. See id. at 256-57. Stevens stated that Adarand was only the third case in
which the Court had considered a federal race-based affirmative action program, and that the
decision in Adrand conflicted with the previous two holdings. See id. Justice Stevens further
noted that the majority's reliance on any inconsistency between Metro Broadcasting and
Croson was misplaced because Croson involved a city ordinance. See id.
152. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995).
153. See id. at 151. The University's Banneker scholarship program was a merit-based
program open only to African-Americans. See id. at 152. The University also offered Francis
Scott Key scholarships, but the Francis Scott Key program had stricter academic standards than
the Banneker program. See id. Daniel Podberesky was ineligible for a Banneker scholarship
because he was Hispanic and did not meet the academic requirements of the Key scholarship.
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and the district court agreed, that the scholarship program was aimed
at the present effects of past discrimination at the University, 154 and
that it was narrowly tailored to remedy those effects.155 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied strict scrutiny in a way that
appeared to be fatal in fact' 56 and reversed the district court's
summary judgment in favor of the University. 157 The Fourth Circuit,
in turn, entered summary judgment in favor of Podberesky. 158
The court of appeals took issue with the district court's finding
that the University suffered present effects resulting from historical
racial discrimination.159 First, the court of appeals could find no link
between the University's prior admitted discrimination and present
campus attitudes. 60 Instead, the court attributed any current problems
at the University to societal discrimination.'16 The appellate court
held that, although the University admitted to past discrimination and
it demonstrated that there was a basis in fact for the perception by
African-Americans of a hostile climate, the fact that societal
discrimination exists precluded the inference of a nexus between the
two facts.' 62 The court did not indicate how the University could
overcome this hurdle, leaving one to wonder if this portion of the
See id.
154. See id. (citing 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1082 (D. Md. 1993)).
155. See id. (citing 838 F. Supp. at 1094).
156. The court stated: "To have a present effect of past discrimination sufficient to justify
the program, the party seeking to implement the program must, at a minimum, prove that the
effect it proffers is caused by the past discrimination and that the effect is of sufficient
magnitude to justify the program." Id. at 153.
157. See id. at 156.
158. Seeid. at 162.
159. The University and the district court had agreed on four present effects: (1) a poor
reputation within the African-American community, (2) underrepresentation by African-
Americans at the University, (3) low retention and graduation rates for African-American
students, and (4) the perception that the campus atmosphere was hostile to African-Americans.
See id. at 152.
160. See id. at 154. The district court found that student surveys and focus groups revealed
hostility manifested by fraternities and sororities, self-segregation in classrooms, social
situations and dining rooms, and claimed racist or patronizing behavior by faculty. See id. at
154 n.2 (citing 838 F. Supp. at 1092-93). The circuit court held that "mere knowledge" of prior
discrimination alone could not be considered, "[o]therwise, as long as there are people who
have access to history books, there will be programs such as this one." Id. at 154.
161. See id. at 154.
162. Societal discrimination was found by the fact hat several Northern universities
suffered from similar racial problems. See id. at 154.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol54/iss1/10
THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION
Podberesky test remains fatal in fact so long as societal
discrimination exists.
The Fourth Circuit next turned to the defendant's reliance on
statistical data, namely African-American underrepresentation in the
student population and low retention and graduation rates, to
demonstrate present effects of past discrimination. 163 Relying on the
case's posture as a motion for summary judgment, the court found
that the possibility of other causes, such as "economic ... factors,"
could preclude summary judgment. 164 However, even if the
University had been able to demonstrate sufficient present effects of
past discrimination to satisfy the court of appeals, the program still
would have failed the "narrowly tailored" test. 165 The court of appeals
admitted that the program did not establish a quota 166 and held that, in
considering whether the scholarship program was in fact narrowly
tailored, the court would look to race-neutral alternatives and
"whether the program actually furthers a different objective from the
one it claimed to remedy."' 67 However, the court of appeals stated
that the district court had erred in not giving weight to the fact that
the scholarships were not exclusively for Maryland residents. 68 The
court of appeals found this fact indicative of a lack of narrow
tailoring 169 because the University argued that the purpose of the
Banneker scholarship was to increase the number of qualified
163. See id. at 155.
164. See id. at 155-56. It could be argued that the African-American students' economic
problems could be attributed to past discrimination, but those problems would be attributed to
society as a whole and not the University. Thus, this is not the kind of present effect that the
court would be willing to consider.
165. Seeia at 157-58.
166. Seeid. at 158 n.10.
167. Id. at 158 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 507).
168. See id. at 158 n.l 1. In one year, seventeen of thirty-one Banneker scholars were
students from outside Maryland. See id. The court of appeals chided the University for
admitting one (presumably black) Jamaican to the program, giving "African-American a
hemispheric meaning." Id.
169. See id. at 159. It is not clear why awarding a scholarship to an African-American from
Pennsylvania, for example, is any less capable of remedying the effects of past University of
Maryland discrimination than awarding the same scholarship to a Maryland-born student.
Certainly the court cannot suggest that African-Americans perceived the University as aiming
its prior discrimination at African-Americans from Maryland only, while during this same
period of historical discrimination, welcoming African-Americans from the other forty-nine
states.
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African-American Maryland residents attending the University. 170
The court of appeals also rejected the University's argument that
Banneker scholars would act as role-models, and, thus, attract more
African-American students.17 1 In rejecting this argument, the court of
appeals seemed to erroneously believe that the use of a Banneker
scholar as a role model was rejected by the Supreme Court in Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education. 72 However, the Wygant decision
rejected the role-model theory only as applied to the hiring of
teachers based on race. 73 The Wygant decision, therefore, was not
applicable to the use of Banneker scholars as role models.
Finally, the court of appeals held that the University had not
attempted any race-neutral alternative measures.1 74 It would,
170. Seeid.
171. See id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality
opinion)).
172. See id. The court stated that Wygant "expressly rejected" the role-model theory. Id.
(citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276). However, Wygant's discussion of the role-model theory is
contained in an opinion by Justice Powell that announces the judgment of the court, but isjoined by only three other Justices. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 269. In addition, Wygant was
decided in a very different context because African-American teachers were sought as role
models for African-American students in a school system in the process of desegregation. See
id. at 270-72. In Wygant, the issue was whether a collective bargaining agreement, pursuant to
which a school board gave preferential layoff protection to minority hires, violated equal
protection. See id. at 269-70. When layoffs became necessary, compliance with the agreement
would have meant the dismissal of tenured non-minority teachers, while the probationary
minorities would have retained their jobs. See id. at 271.
The Wygant plurality expressed several concerns with the role-model theory. First, it had
"no logical stopping point," because it would allow the School Board to engage in
"discriminatory hiring and layoffs long past the point required for any legitimate remedial
purpose." Id. at 275. Second, it would require year-to-year calibration, even after desegregation
was achieved. See id. Third, the role model theory could be used to discriminate against
African-Americans because a small number of African-American students could be used tojustify a small number of African-American teachers. See id. at 276. This third reason had
absolutely no relevance to the Podberesky situation, because when students are intended to be
used as role models for each other, there can not possibly be any use of the role-model theory to
limit the number of African-American students admitted to a university. Furthermore, the first
two reasons for the plurality's rejection of the role-model theory in Wygant necessarily hinge on
the fact that the teacher-to-student role model theory involves what is essentially a quota
system, and, as the Court held, leads to a separate but equal system of African-American
teachers teaching African-American students. See id. (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
173. See id. at 270-72.
174. Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 161. The court relied upon a University of Maryland study
which suggested that drop-out rates could be lowered by increasing campus job activities and
by providing more reasonably priced campus housing. See id.
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however, seem difficult for the University to have fashioned any
race-neutral remedy that would have demonstrated to African-
Americans that the University had ceased to be an environment
hostile to African-American students. Thus, alternative measures
would have been ineffective, and, therefore, useless.
C. Hopwood v. Texas
In Hopwood v. Texas, 17 5 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held the University of Texas School of Law's affirmative action
program unconstitutional. 176 The Hopwood holding is steeped in
irony, having involved the best-intentioned efforts177 of the prestigous
University of Texas School of Law to boost its minority
enrollment. 178 In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit appears to have applied
Justice Scalia's cynical argument that racial preferences appear to
"'even the score' ... only if one embraces the proposition that our
society is appropriately viewed as divided into races."'179 Appearing
to contradict Bakke,'80 the Fifth Circuit held that the law school "may
not use race as a factor" in admissions. 18 In so doing, the court found
"no compelling justification"' 82 for the law school's affirmative
action program under strict scrutiny analysis.'83
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by noting the Equal Protection
Clause's purpose of preventing discrimination on the basis of race.1
84
The court found that strict scrutiny must be applied when "evaluating
all racial classifications, including those characterized by their
175. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
176. See id. at 934.
177. See id. at 935 (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1984)).
178. See id. at 935 (citing America's Best Graduate Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 20, 1995, at 84).
179. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia J.,
concurring), cited in Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940 n.17.
180. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 941-42; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-17.
181. 78 F.3d at 954.
182. Id. at 934.
183. See id. The district court in Hopwood had found two constitutional justifications for
the use of race as a factor in admissions decisions: obtaining the educational benefits of
diversity and overcoming the effects of past discrimination. See id. at 4 (citing Hopwood, 861
F. Supp. at 571).
184. See id. at 940.
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proponents as 'benign' or 'remedial. ' ' 1 85 The Hopwood plaintiffs
argued that diversity is not a compelling state interest or, in the
alternative, that the law school had misapplied Powell's Bakke
standard and used race not as a "plus" but, rather, as a "strong
determinate." 186 Rather than finding a misapplication of the Bakke
standard, the Fifth Circuit rejected Justice Powell's argument
entirely, holding that any consideration of race or ethnicity for the
purpose of achieving a diverse student body can never be a
compelling state interest. 87 The Fifth Circuit further criticized the
diversity argument by rejecting the proposition that race can be used
as a proxy for other characteristics that contribute to genuine
diversity.'88
The court ultimately rejected the law school's diversity
justification by stating that "there is essentially only one compelling
state interest to justify racial classifications: remedying past
wrongs."'189 But the Hopwood court, like the Podberesky court, failed
to make the one-part "past wrongs" test a genuine test. Instead, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals created just another "test" that is strict
in theory but fatal in fact. 190 The court made its test "fatal in fact" by
narrowing the scope of the discrimination that the University or the
court may consider.' 91 The court agreed with the Podberesky court
that knowledge alone of past racial bias by the University cannot
185. Id. at 940 (quotingAdarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
186. Id. at 944.
187. See id. at 945-46, 948. The court based its decision on three rationales. First, the court
observed that Powell's Bakke opinion was not a majority opinion. See id. at 945. Second, the
court stated that non-remedial use of racial classification can never be justified in education
cases. See id. Finally, the court held that classification on the basis of race for purposes of
diversity "frustrates rather than facilitates, the goals of equal protection." Id.
188. See id. at 946. The court stated that the assumption that "a certain individual possesses
characteristics by virtue of being a member of a certain racial group .... does not withstand
scrutiny." Id. Furthemore, the court stated that "[t]o believe that a person's race controls his
point of view is to stereotype him." Id. The court was willing, however, to go as far as to state,
"[w]e recognize that the use of some factors such as economic or educational background of
one's parents may be somewhat correlated with race." Id. at 947 n.31.
189. Id. at 944.
190. See infra notes 264-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "fatal in fact"
test.
191. See id. at 949-50 (noting societal discrimination cannot be used as a justification for
remedial measures) (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, at 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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justify race-based remedies. 192 Moreover, the court stated that the
past discrimination must have occurred in the same governmental
unit seeking to apply the remedial measure.
193
While the Hopwood court conceded that the State of Texas had
discriminated in the past,194 it concluded that the State's education
system as a whole was an overly broad classification of a state actor
to target for remedial measures, and that the University of Texas was
itself "too expansive."' 95 Thus, the court concluded that the law
school was the sole state actor whose past discrimination was
relevant to the analysis.196 Finding that the University of Texas
School of Law's admissions program failed strict scrutiny, the Fifth
Circuit held that the school may not use race as a factor in admissions
decisions.
197
In a concurring opinion, Judge Wiener argued that neither the law
school nor the Texas university system as a whole had "established
the existence of present effects of past discrimination sufficient to
justify the use of racial classifications."'198 Judge Wiener assumed
arguendo that diversity can be a compelling interest, but voted with
the majority because he concluded that the law school's remedy was
not narrowly tailored. 199 Judge Wiener's ratio decendi was three-fold.
First, Wiener stated that if Bakke is to be "declared dead, the
Supreme Court, not a three-judge panel of a circuit court should make
that pronouncement." 200 Second, he noted that Justice O'Connor
specifically stated that Adarand was not the "death knell" for
affirmative action.20' Third, he stated that, because the remedy was
not narrowly tailored, the court need not reach the issue of whether a
192. See id. at 953.
193. See id. at 950-51.
194. See id. at 951 ("No one disputes that in the past, Texas state actors have discriminated
against some minorities in public schools.').
195. Id.
196. See id. at 952. The court ignored the possibility that undergraduate grade point
average is a more important factor than race in admissions and that African-American students'
lower GPAs may have been obtained as a result of admitted past discrimination in lower level
educational facilities.
197. Seeid. at962.
198. Id. (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
199. Seeid.
200. Id. at 963.
201. See id. at 963-64 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237).
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compelling interest existed.20 2
In rendering its decision, the Hopwood court failed to see either
that the past effects of discrimination linger in the present or that we
do not live in a color-blind society.203 This oversight is ironic,
202. See id. at 964.
203. It seems beyond the need for debate that our society is not yet color-blind. However,
Justice Scalia claims, at the very least, that we have a color-blind government: "In the eyes of
government, we are just one race here. It is American." Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J.
concurring). Society clearly is not color-blind, despite Justice Scalia's assertions to the contrary.
See id.
Landlords are not color-blind. "[I]n many metropolitan areas one-quarter to one-half of all
housing inquiries by blacks are met with clearly discriminatory responses." A COMMON
DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 50 (G. Jaynes & R. Williams eds., 1989), cited in
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 273 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Christopher Edley, Jr., NOT
ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE AND AMERICAN VALUES 49 (1996);
MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
STUDY: SYNTHESIS i-vii (1991) (finding that over half of all African-Americans and Hispanics
surveyed experienced some form of unfavorable treatment in their housing search), cited in
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 274 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Attorneys conducting voir dire are not color-blind. "Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos,
Mexicans or member of any minority race on ajury, no matter how rich or how well educated."
Instruction Book of the Dallas, Texas Prosecutor's Office, quoted in Steve McGonigle & Ed
Timms, Race Bias Pervades Jury Selection, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 1986, at IA.
Justice Marshall cited the excerpt in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 n.3 (1986).
Prospective employers are not color-blind. Blacks and Hispanics encounter potential
employers who exhibit some degree of prejudice 25% of the time. See CHRISTOPHER EDLEY,
JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE AND AMERICAN VALUES 49
(1996). In one study, whites received 52% more job offers than equally qualified Hispanics. See
H. Cross et al., Employee Hiring Practices: Differential Treatment of Hispanic and Anglo Job
Seekers 42 (Urban Institute Report 90-4, 1990); see also Margery A. Turner et al.,
Opportunities Denied, Opportunities Diminished: Racial Discrimination in Hiring xi (Urban
Institute Report 91-9, 1991).
Patterns of income distribution are not color blind. Blacks earn about 60% of the median
income of whites. See Christopher Edley, Jr., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION, RACE AND AMERICAN VALUES 43 (1996).
The Confederate battle flag, which appears in a number of modern southern state flags, is
not a color-blind symbol. In Georgia, Governor Zell Miller failed in his attempt to convince the
state legislature to remove the Confederate battle emblem from the state flag in 1993. See Chris
Burritt, Focus on a Disputed Banner, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 24, 1997, at A10. A black's
suit challenging the continued use of the flag on equal protection and First Amendment grounds
also failed. See Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1199
(1998). The Confederate battle flag flew over Alabama's state capital until 1993, when a state
judge ordered its removal. See Burrit, supra, at AI0. However, it still flies on the Capitol's
grounds at a confederate monument See id. Mississippi still incorporates the emblem in its state
flag. See id. The Confederate battle flag still flies above the South Carolina Capitol, but on
January 23, 1997, the state House of Representatives voted to let South Carolina's citizens vote
on its removal in a referendum. See id.; see also Flag Removal Unpopular in New York,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 15, 1997, at H2 (discussing public outcry after Governor Pataki
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considering that it took an order by the United States Supreme Court
for the University of Texas School of Law to admit its first African-
American student, Herman Marion Sweatt,2°4 and that, after attending
his first year of law school, Sweatt was compelled to leave because
he was subjected to a series of racial slurs and threats.20 5 While the
Hopwood court seemed not to draw any lesson from Sweatt's
experience,20 6 Texas African-Americans have absorbed the message
ordered Georgia flag removed from display at New York State Capitol).
Car salesmen are not color-blind. See Ian Ayers, Fair Driving: Gender and Race
Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REV. 817, 819 (1991) (stating black
males pay twice the mark-up of white males using identical bargaining strategies in retail car
sales).
Sports attitudes and ownership are not color-blind. See generally KENNETH L.
SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND SPORTS IN AMERICA (1996), reviewed in
Timothy Davis, Who's In and Who's Out: Racial Discrimination in Sports, 28 PACIFIC L. J. 341
(1997). Professor Shropshire argues that the racial bias that exists against African-Americans in
professional sports demonstrates why the use of color-blind policy is premature. SHROPSHIRE,
supra, at 7. Professor Shropshire notes that only 7 of the 275 individuals with ownership
interests in the 3 major professional sports (football, baseball, and basketball) were African-
American, and none held a controlling interest. See id. at 36, cited in Davis, supra, at 352.
Furthermore, African-Americans represented just 3% of the 150 active agents in Major League
Baseball, and 14% of those in the National Football League. SHROPSHIRE, supra, at 131, cited
in Davis, supra, at 370. Appropriately, when Tom Cruise shouts, "Show me the money," JERRY
MAGUIRE (TriStar 1996), the money is green, the player is black, and the agent is white. See id.
College athletics are also not color-blind. See, e.g., Black Football, Basketball Players Source
of Cheap Laborfor Schools, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 2, 1997, at E9 (arguing that the two
sports in which African-Americans constitute the majority of athletes-basketball and
football-account for 91% of all sports revenues and subsidize "white" sports such as
gymnastics, golf, swimming, and soccer). A majority of African-American athletes at Division I
schools fail to graduate (only 39% of African-American basketball players graduate and 46% of
African-American football players graduate). See id.
204. See Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
205. See 84 F.3d 720, 724 (5th Cir. 1996) (Stewart, J., dissenting from failure to grant
rehearing en banc).
206. The experience of Mr. Sweatt was not lost on Judge Stewart, one of the seven Fifth
Circuit Judges voting for rehearing en banc in Hopwood. See 84 F.3d at 724. Judge Stewart
stated in his dissent:
A year after the Supreme Court ordered that Sweatt be admitted, he left the law school
"without graduating after being subjected to racial slurs from students and professors,
cross bumings, and tire slashings." Furthermore, "the record reflects that during the
1950s, and into the 1960s, the University of Texas continued to implement
discriminatory policies against both black and Mexican American students." It was not
until 1983 that Texas even agreed, after years of threats of federal action, to an
acceptable plan to desegregate its higher education system. In 1987 and again in 1994,
the Department of Education instructed Texas to maintain its plan. To this day,
Texas's higher education system still has not been declared in compliance with Titie
VI and the Fourteenth Amendment.
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of Hopwood: African Americans' applications were down forty-two
percent at the law school.
207
D. Wooden v. Board of Regents
In Wooden v. Board ofRegent, 208 eleven plaintiffs filed suit in the• • •209
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia,
seeking injunctive relief against the University of Georgia.210 The
plaintiffs have requested that the court order Georgia's university
system to cease using race as a factor in admissions, 21' faculty hiring,
faculty promotions, and faculty assignment decisions.12 All of the
University's facilities would be affected, from the more than ninety
percent white flagship University of Georgia at Athens, to the
University's three predominantly black colleges. 1 3 The plaintiffs'
brief argues that the three predominantly black colleges are
academically inferior because of the large number of remedial classes
they offer, and that this inferiority creates a "separate but equal"
Id. at 725 (quoting Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 555-57 (W.D. Texas 1994)) (citations
omitted).
207. See Tom Teepen, Segregation Resurges to Our Nation's Shame, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Apr. 13, 1997, at G2.
208. Wooden v. Board of Regents, No. CV 497-45 (S.D. Ga. filed Mar. 3, 1997) (on file
with the author).
209. See id., Complaint at 3-8 (on file with the author). The plaintiffs include a black
teacher (the named plaintiff), white teachers, black parents of an African-American student in
the Georgia University system, and two white students who argue that they were denied
admission to a school that admitted African-Americans with objective scores lower than their
own scores. See id.
210. See id. The plaintiffs seek (1) a declaration that the state's policies violate the Equal
Protection Clause, (2) temporary and preliminary injunctions prohibiting the use of race in all
admissions and all faculty hiring, promotion, and placement decisions pending a decision on the
merits, (3) an injunction requiring the University system to implement a desegregation plan that
would end the racial and qualitative differences within the system, and (4) a jury trial on
damages and costs of the suit. See id.
211. Of course, this presupposes that the University system uses race as a factor in
admissions. Race is one of fifteen factors considered by the University of Georgia at Athens
and is not used elsewhere in the University system. No whites are excluded from the three
historically African-American schools. See Cynthia Tucker, College Admissions: Lawsuit
Might Shore up AJfirmative Action, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 5, 1997, at A14.
212. See Wooden, No. CV 497-45, Complaint at 17.
213. See id. at 8. The three predominantly black colleges are Fort Valley State, Albany
State, and Savannah State. African-Americans represent more than 88% of the students in these
schools. See id. at 9.
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system in Georgia.214
Three aspects of the case are of particular interest.215 First, the
plaintiffs' brief follows the Fifth Circuit's holding in Hopwood216 and
rejects Justice Powell's dicta in Bakke,217 to argue that racial diversity
can never be a compelling state interest.218 Second, the suit asks that
the University give preferences to those from disadvantaged
backgrounds, rather than just those of a certain race.219 Finally, the
suit demands that any University of Georgia plan that seeks to
achieve desegregation not be race-based. 220 However, the suit fails to
suggest a methodology for accomplishing desegregation without
221taking race into consideration.
214. See id. at 9-11. Scholastic Aptitude Test scores at the three schools range from 675 to
708 for the 1994 entering classes at the three majority African-American schools, but the lowest
average SAT score at a predominantly white university was 822. See id. at 11.
215. Of equal interest are the key players in the case. The firm representing the plaintiffs
successfully argued Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), before the United States Supreme
Court. The judge assigned to the Wooden case, United States District Court Judge B. Avant
Edenfield, had previously ruled that Georgia's eleventh congressional district was a racial
gerrymander in Miller v. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994). When Wooden was filed,
the state's Attorney General was Michael Bowers, who had previously sent a letter to the state's
chancellor suggesting that the University's policies be brought into compliance with the law as
articulated in Hopwood, even though Georgia is not in the same judicial Circuit as Texas. See
Mark Sherman & Reagan Walker, Ga. Colleges Face Scrutiny on Race, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Apr. 10, 1996, at C1.
Subsequently, Bowers resigned from his position as Attorney General to run for Governor
and was replaced by Thurbert Baker, Georgia's first African-American Attorney General, and
the only African-American currently serving as an Attorney General in the United States. See
Kathy Alexander, Baker Blazing Trail as Black Attorney General, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May
3, 1997, at Al; see also Kathy Alexander, Baker Now Must Earn His Own Place in the Sun,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 3, 1997, at Al.
In addition, the NAACP, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and sixteen
African-American high school and college students have sought to intervene as defendants,
expressing concern that the state's defense that it has eliminated all vestiges of past
discrimination is inaccurate. See Bill Rankin, Intervention Sought in Suit Against Colleges,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 21, 1997, at D7.
216. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
217. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-17.
218. See Wooden, No. CV 497-45, Complaint at 17.
219. See id. As discussed infra Part V.C, this Article argues that because of the present
effects of past discrimination, race is an excellent proxy for economic disadvantage.
220. See id.
221. See id. This defect was noted by Judge Edenfield, who has called upon the plaintiffs to
specify the remedy that they seek. See Judge Tells Attorney to Clarify Lavsuit on Bias at Ga.
Colleges, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 18, 1997, at C6.
Initially at least, if the preliminary injunction is granted and the state cannot use race in its
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V. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JUSTIFIED
A. Race as a Proxy for Disadvantage: Preliminary Considerations
Any discussion of the color-blind theory is fraught with irony222
because "[i]n order to get beyond racism we must first take account
of race.''23 Moreover, it is ironic that race-conscious legislators and
judges have often applied the color-conscious Constitution to the
detriment of African-Americans and other minorities. 4 Only now,
when minorities have made some minor gains, have political and
judicial leaders claimed the need to apply the Constitution in a color-
admissions process, the University of Georgia at Athens will admit fewer African-American
students because its current African-American enrollment of less than 10% is a product of a
system that counts minority status as a "plus" factor in admissions. Similarly, it is hard to
imagine how additional white students will be attracted to the predominantly African-American
schools without a campaign that utilizes race in some manner.
222. Justice Marshall recognized in his Bakke opinion that
it is more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of class-based
discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a class-based
remedy for that discrimination is permissible. In declining to so hold, today's
judgment ignores the fact that for several hundred years Negroes have been
discriminated against, not as individuals, but rather solely because of the color of their
skins. It is unnecessary in 20th-century America to have individual Negroes
demonstrate that they have been the victims of racial discrimination; the racism of our
society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed
to escape its impact. The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind,
not just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of
slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as inferior by the law. And that
mark has endured. The dream of America as the great melting pot has not been
realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he has never even made it into the pot.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400-01. But cf Professor Strauss:
The one option that is not open is the ideal of colorblindness--treating race as if it
were, like eye color, a wholly irrelevant characteristic. That is because it is not a
wholly irrevalent characteristic. Race correlates with other things .... Moreover, it is
hardly surprising that race correlates with other things. Whatever the other possible
causes of the correlation, centuries of discrimination explicitly based on race have
forced some characteristics on blacks-on all blacks, simply because they are black,
since that was the basis of the discrimination. In these circumstances it would be a
miracle if a correlation between race and other characteristics did not exist. That
correlation makes colorblindness unattainable, no matter what the legal rules.
Strauss, supra note 139, at 114-15 (footnotes omitted).
223. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407, (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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blind manner.225 In some zero-sum game situations, the call for
change has indeed come at the expense of "innocent ' 226 whites,
227
such as Allan Bakke or Cheryl Hopwood. As Professor Kull has
noted, "[t]here is an undeniable irony, which close attention to the
color-blind history will only underscore, in applying a rule of
nondiscrimination to frustrate measures designed (however
imperfectly) to promote equality of condition for black Americans as
a group."'
The legacy of slavery and color-conscious treatment by both
society and the legal system in the post-slavery era is an African-
American populace that can legitimately claim the lack of a level
playing field in many areas. This uneven playing field is particularly
evident in the area of admission to university programs (and related
scholarship opportunities). Even affirmative action opponent
Professor Fried admits that, "It is impossible to ignore racial
differences entirely-pure color-blindness is too extreme a
principle. 229
Although the courts would have us look only at the present effects
of past discrimination by the individual educational institution
actor, 23  it is instructive to look at the present effects of past
discrimination faced by a prospective African-American applicant to
any educational institution. A hypothetical examination will help to
determine whether a grave injustice is heaped upon white applicants
when a minority applicant is awarded a "plus" in admissions by using
225. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d at 945-48.
226. The term "innocent" assumes that the whites who lost out to African-Americans in the
zero-sum admissions game were not themselves participants in societal discrimination against
minorities. To use the courts' more restrictive test, it assumes that they were not participants in
the prior discrimination by the state actor now found guilty of taking affirmative action to cure
the present effects of that past discrimination. Of course, it can be argued that one can be
innocent of any personal racism and still have received a benefit from societal discrimination.
227. Such "innocent" victims may also belong to minority groups, such as Daniel
Podberesky, a Hispanic. See 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
228. KULL, supra note 3, at ix.
229. Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104
HARv. L. REv. 107, 111 (1990). Professor Fried's article describes situations in which color-
blindness is inappropriate, such as screening for ethnic-particular diseases such as sickle-cell
anemia and Tay-Sachs syndrome. See id (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 314 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)); see also id. at Il1 n.19 (providing a remedy for situations in which a bigot has
victimized a person based on his or her race).
230. See, e.g., Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 950-51.
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race as a proxy for disadvantage.
Assume that a thirty-year-old African-American is applying to
law school and that the educational attainments of one's parents are a
factor in one's own educational success. In addition, assume that
having a lawyer or other professional as a parent is a "plus" in the
eyes of law school admissions committees. Finally, assume that our
theoretical African-American applicant's parents were born in
1937.231 What sort of present effects will they-parents and
children-have witnessed?
The parents will have grown up in a very segregated society, one
in which their chances of becoming lawyers or other professionals
were very slim. They were thirteen when the United States Supreme
Court ordered the University of Texas to admit Herman Marion
Sweatt to its law school,2 2 and just a year older when Sweatt left the
school after being subjected to racial slurs by students and faculty
alike.233 They were in their forties when the Texas university system
finally implemented an acceptable desegregation plan.234
Were things a great deal better for our hypothetical African-
American applying to law school in 1997?235 Our student was born
the year Loving v. Virginia23 6 was decided-at a time when "federal
231. This assumes a thirty-year generation. See 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 436 (2d
ed. 1991).
232. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
233. See 84 F.3d at 724 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
234. See supra note 178.
235. Progress has been slow, and present effects of past discrimination remain. For
example, our hypothetical applicant was three years old when the Virginia state legislature
attempted to repeal "Carry Me Back to Old Virginia" as the state song. Although the song was
considered offensive to some because it contained words like "darkey" and "massa," and
allegedly glorified the institution of slavery, the move was consistently defeated every year
until 1997. In 1997, the Virginia legislature retired the song without fanfare after a 100-0 vote
and no debate. See Controversial State Song Retired, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 18, 1997, at
AS. In addition, just this past year, five white students recently painted themselves black in
order to look like the Jackson 5 in a fraternity skit at the predominantly white State University
of West Georgia, prompting the filing of formal complaints by African-American students. See
Don Melvin, University Seeks RacialDialogue, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 24, 1997, at Dl.
236. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding Virginia's law prohibiting interracial
marriages unconstitutional). The statute at issue in Loving was facially neutral because it
applied equally to whites and African Americans. This attribute was relied upon by the
Supreme Court for finding a statute constitutional in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)
(holding an Alabama law prohibiting sexual relations between persons of different races not a
denial of equal protection because it applied equally to all races).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol54/iss1/10
THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION
judges in the still-segregated South were fighting desegregation with
massive resistance. 237 When she was born, the infamous Tuskegee
Syphilis Study was still underway.238 Racism still impacts many areas
of our society, and certainly has done so during the lives of our
hypothetical student and her parents.
African-American students applying for university admission
have grown up in a society impacted by racism. Therefore, it can be
argued that using race as a proxy for disadvantage is justified by
reference to the very real present effects of past discrimination faced
by African-American applicants to educational institutions. But
opponents of a color-conscious admissions process attack this thesis
on two major grounds. First, they argue that the Constitution
mandates a color-blind approach. Second, they argue that if
disadvantage and the leveling of the playing field are the issues that
affirmative action seeks to remedy, then disadvantage rather than race
should be the basis for awarding a "plus."
The remainder of this Article addresses these issues and makes the
case that there is still a place for color-conscious affirmative action in
the higher education admissions process. First, as has been
demonstrated throughout this Article, the Constitution as written,
amended, and interpreted does not mandate a color-blind approach.
Second, it is an unfortunate reality that in contemporary American
society, racial minority status makes a very good proxy for
disadvantage and, indeed, makes a more appropriate justification for
a "plus" than many other proxies that are used more prevalently.
Turning then to affirmative action in admissions as it exists today,
this Article discusses what affirmative action is not: a quota or an
irrebutable presumption of disadvantage. It examines the
constitutional test for affirmative action programs as it exists after
Adarand, and argues that the Podberesky and Hopwood courts have
misstated the test. The Justices of the Supreme Court must be taken at
their word that the applicable strict scrutiny is not "fatal in fact."
239
237. KULL, supra note 3, at 170.
238. See JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHYLIS EXPERIMENT (2d ed.
1993).
239. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 ("[We wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict
in theory, but fatal in fact."').
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
198 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 54:157
Working under this assumption, this Article presents a theoretical
admissions program that addresses a compelling state interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieving its goal.
B. The Constitution is not Color-Blind
If the Constitution is to be viewed as color-blind, as Justices
Thomas and Scalia and the Podberesky and Hopwood panels would
have it, the debate ends at that point. A color-blind Constitution
would require us to solve the problems of a color-conscious society
with color-blind solutions. Undergraduate and graduate admissions
programs would, thus, be totally precluded from considering race as a
"plus" or otherwise. However, the Constitution as drafted and
amended by the Bill of Rights, and as interpreted by early case law
such as the Dredd Scott decision, was not a color-blind document.
Instead, it saw Eighteenth Century America in colors of white, black,
red, and yellow, denying citizenship to all but the white. Indeed, it
protected and guaranteed the institution of slavery into the nineteenth
century without actually using the term "slave" or "black." Despite
occasional exceptions, such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins,240 this
Constitution gave minorities none of the protections one would
expect from a color-blind document.
With the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress had a clear
opportunity to make the Constitution truly color-blind. Congress
could have included color-blind language, mandating that "no
discrimination shall be made on account of race or color."24' Such
color-blind language was presented and debated, but eventually
rejected on the grounds of political expediency.242 Congress instead
240. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
241. KULL, supra note 3, at 73 (quoting Senator Stevens's proposed language).
242. Any argument that color-blind equality was created by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, was destroyed by the five-to-four
decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (refusing to give any greater scope to
the Reconstruction Amendments than that which was suggested by their purpose of securing the
freedom of the slave race). Subsequent expansion of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses left the Privileges and Immunities Clause outside the mainstream of the color-blindness
argument, although it was "probably the clause from which the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment expected most." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 22 (1980).
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substituted an ambiguous standard-equal protection-that would be
continuously debated, but would have the immediate advantage of
attacking the South's Black Codes without putting at risk segregated
schools 243 or bans on interracial marriages. 244
Progress came in the form of affirmative action programs
designed to remedy the present effects of discrimination in a wide
range of contexts, and in a manner that could not be color-blind. In
the context of higher education, affirmative action sometimes took
the form of impermissible quotas, but also manifested itself as
constitutionally permissible "plusses." 245 For example, even though
the Bakke Court found the University of California at Davis's
Medical School admissions process to be flawed, five Justices held
that an admissions program that took race into account would
withstand an Equal Protection Clause challenge.246 The crucial point
from Bakke-that race may be a factor in higher education
admissions decisions-has not been directly overruled by the
Supreme Court.247
C. Race as a Proxy for Disadvantage in a Color-Conscious Society
African-Americans as a group are disadvantaged in our society
because of the present effects of past discrimination. Of course, not
all African-American individuals are disadvantaged, and many
applicants who are disadvantaged are not African-American. Thus,
the opponents of using race as a proxy in affirmative action programs
argue that educational institutions seeking diversity in their student
bodies should seek out students with diverse viewpoints and
243. See Tribe, supra note 28, at 204. The same Congress that drafted the Equal Protection
Clause funded segregated schools for the District of Columbia. See id.
244. See Melissa L. Sanders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96
MICH. L. REv. 245, 331 (1997).
245. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
246. See id.
247. Judge Stewart argued in his dissent to the denial of rehearing Hopwood en banc that if
Bakke is to be overruled, the Supreme Court must take such action. See 84 F.3d at 724 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Yet Bakke has not been overruled for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has
called for universal application of strict scrutiny for all raced-based measures, a test that by
definition anticipates the possibility that some race-based measures are constitutional. Second,
the cases since Bakke have all involved affirmative action programs in contexts other than the
unique one of higher education.
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lifestyles, and not just those of a specific race. They argue that
entities that have discriminated in the past should seek out their
specific victims.
In an ideal world, it would indeed be preferable to only look at
individual applicants as individual people. However, in the real
world, a good proxy is sometimes a practical and financial necessity.
In addition, past discrimination continues to have present effects on
the entire African-American populace. Moreover, every single
African-American in the United States is in some way affected by the
present discrimination that permeates our society. 248 As Justice
O'Connor has noted: "The unhappy persistence of both the practice
and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority
groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not
disqualified from acting in response to it."249 Race makes a useful
proxy for disadvantage because it is race that society discriminates
against. It is also clear that race makes a better proxy for
disadvantage than other human characteristics. As this Article has
demonstrated, our society clearly is not color-blind. It is far less clear
that society continues to discriminate based on other factors, such as
sex and sexual orientation. While this author does not doubt that
other groups continue to suffer from widespread discrimination, such
discrimination is much more difficult to identify. If members of such
groups are able to demonstrate that they have been discriminated
against, then admissions committees should consider that
248. Although a full treatment of the subject is outside the scope of this analysis, the
proponents of Critical Race Theory have written much that illuminates the proposition that
American society has deep racial problems. Critical Race Theory traces its origins to a June,
1989 conference in Wisconsin. See generally T. Alexander Aleinkoff, The Constitution in
Context: The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 325 (1992); Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518 (1980) (a work predating the theoretical start date of the movement but expressing its
themes); Derrick Bell, Reconstruction's Racial Realities, 23 RLrTGERs L. 261 (1992); Richard
Delgado, Legal Scholarship: Insiders, Outsiders, Editors, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 717 (1992);
Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional Ghetto, 1993 WISc. L. REV. 627;
Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Re-Cognizing Inequality: Rebellion, Redemption, and Struggle for
Transcendence in the Equal Protection of the Law, 27 HARv. L. REV. 9 (1992); Alex M.
Johnson, Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043; Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination
Law and a Jurisprudence for a Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J 1329 (1991).
249. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
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discrimination in formulating their admissions decisions. However,
because we know that every single African-American feels the
present effects of past discrimination, race is an instrumental proxy
for disadvantage. Other potential factors are either less useful250 or
are already a part of the admissions calculus. t
Race can be used as a proxy in American society precisely
because of the present effects of past discrimination. Where race is
used as a proxy for an admissions plus, it can survive strict scrutiny
as long as it does not establish a quota. As the Court discussed in
Adarand, the need for solutions to this nation's racial problems is
compelling.252 Using race as a proxy is indeed a narrowly-tailored
solution because every African-American is affected by society's
racial discrimination. Perhaps when race ceases to be such an
accurate proxy, this issue will have become moot, and affirmative
action will no longer be needed. 3
D. A "Plus" is not a Quota
Where quotas, or rigid "numerical straitjackets, '2 54 are used, they
are illegal and not within the spirit of affirmative action. Affirmative
action seeks to give opportunities to the qualified, not elevate the
unqualified. Where affirmative action is applied illegally, the proper
solution is to correct the illegality, rather than to altogether eradicate
the affirmative measures.
While minority status can create the presumption of an entitlement
to a plus, and majority status can create the presumption that one is
not entitled to a plus, there is no reason why either presumption
cannot be rebutted in the admissions context. Both of these
250. For example, variations in relative wealth could be considered to create diversity. The
fact remains, however, that society continues to see a rich African-American as "African-
American" and a poor white as "white."
251. For example, parents' education and, in the case of graduate admissions, one's
undergraduate institution already play a role in admissions decisions. In addition, schools
already seek out geographic diversity.
252. SeeAdarand, 515 U.S. at 235-37.
253. Any justification of affirmative action implies a termination date when the playing
field has finally been leveled.
254. Deval Patrick, Confronting the Question of Conscience, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1334
(1995).
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presumptions were rebuttable in the federal legislation at issue in
Adarand 5 It is admittedly difficult to picture a third party coming
forward to an admissions committee to rebut a minority applicant's
presumptive plus for disadvantaged status when race is used as a
proxy.25 6 However, most institutions of higher education have a
mechanism whereby a white student can rebut the presumption that
she is not entitled to a plus for disadvantaged status. The mechanism
is usually an essay submitted with other admissions material,
detailing the facts that explain why the white student should be
considered for disadvantaged status.
Even an admissions policy adjusted to compensate for advantaged
minorities and disadvantaged whites will result in the admission of
more minorities and, therefore, fewer whites. Necessarily, the "loser"
in this zero-sum game is the marginal white applicant-the candidate
who scored lower than fellow white applicants offered admission, but
higher than the minority applicant that was elevated because of her
minority plus. However, the fact that some students are admitted
because of a plus should not be a societal concern; all public policy is
about redistribution of wealth and opportunity. A law is not
unconstitutional just because it creates winners and losers. Such
redistribution is fair when the plus creates a level playing field where
one did not previously exist. Redistribution is unfair to the marginal
white applicant only if it tips the playing field in the minority
applicant's favor. Affirmative action merely levels the playing field
by compensating for the present effects of past discrimination. It does
not seek to punish an innocent, marginal white for the sins of his
ancestors. 2
255. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
256. This is more plausible when the third party is also a candidate for the same seat.
257. As Justice Souter stated in his Adarand dissent:
When the extirpation of lingering discriminatory effects is thought to require a catch-
up mechanism, like the racially preferential inducement under the statutes considered
here, the result may be that some members of the historically favored race are hurt by
that remedial mechanism, however innocent they may be of any personal
responsibility for any discriminatory conduct. When this price is considered
reasonable, it is in part because it is a price to be paid only temporarily ......
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 270 (Souter, J., dissenting); cf Bakke, 438 U.S. at 366 n.41 ('Our school
cases have deprived whites of the neighborhood schools of their choice, our Title VII cases
have deprived nondiscriminating employees of their settled seniority expectations and UJO
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American decisions are rarely made strictly on merit, particularly
in the context of education. 258 In fact, a whole host of plusses affect
the admissions process in institutions of higher education.25 9 Plusses
may even be available in private grade schools that provide their
pupils with an advantage in the college admissions process.
260
Consider again a hypothetical but typical university with an
affirmative action program that was instituted because the school is
overwhelmingly white, and the school's administration has concluded
that this was caused by prior societal discrimination. In addition, the
school has concluded that an ethnically diverse student body will
enhance the school's educational quality. One hundred seats are
available for the fall semester class. Ninety-nine seats have been
filled, and the admissions committee is considering two applicants for
the last seat. The admissions committee examines the grades and
Scholastic Aptitude Test scores of applicants, and awards a single
score on a scale of one to one hundred.261 In keeping with the
deprived the Hassidim of bloc voting strength."). Justice Brennan's point in Bakke was that the
Court was well aware that its decisionmaking in the area of race and ethnicity necessarily
created winners and losers.
258. As Justice Blackmun noted in Bakke:
It is somewhat ironic to have us so deeply disturbed over a program where race is an
element of consciousness, and yet to be aware of the fact, as we are, that institutions of
higher learning, albeit more on the undergraduate than the graduate level, have given
conceded preferences up to a point to those possessed of athletic skills, to the children
of alumni, to the affluent who may bestow their largess on the institutions, and to those
having connections with celebrities, the famous and the powerful.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 404.
259. See Alvin P. Sanoff, Did They Admit Me? U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 14, 1997,
at 48. Sanoff's lengthy article focuses on the admissions process at the prestigious University of
Pennsylvania, which offers admission each year to about 4,800 out of 15,400 applicants.
Among the "plusses" noted: rural Pennsylvanians (in part because the school receives $36
million a year in state funds for its veterinary school, which is of interest to rural
Pennsylvanians); Nebraskans (because the state is one of those underrepresented in the
applicant pool); athletes on the cusp of meeting the University's academic admissions criteria
(admittedly, only about thirty-six seats are so allotted); "development cases" (students whose
parents are or may become major contributors (again, only a small number: fifteen to twenty
seats); "legacies" (the children of graduates, "who seem to have only a modest advantage"). See
id at 56.
260. Both savvy guidance counselors who are not overworked and advanced courses are
more likely to be available in private schools. See Sanoff, supra note 259.
261. See generally Hopwood, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996) (essentially, the same
methodology).
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affirmative action goal, the committee then awards five additional
points to any minority candidate. The highest ranked white student
not offered admission has a score of seventy, the highest scoring
minority candidate not admitted with the first ninety-nine admittees
has a raw score of sixty-eight and an adjusted score of seventy-three.
She is admitted and the marginal white candidate is not.
The opponents of affirmative action would attempt to focus the
debate on the contest between the minority admittee and the
displaced, marginal white candidate. They would argue that the white
candidate has been "cheated" because of the sins of his fathers and
the minority candidate has been forever tainted with the stigma of
being an "affirmative action baby., 262 But the student who received
the plus is not competing for the last remaining seat-she is
competing for one of the available one hundred seats. It must also be
remembered that some of the ninety-nine seats have already been
filled by less qualified siblings, legacies, athletes, and the sons and
daughters of high rollers and celebrities, all of whom were admitted
because of a plus. 263 It makes little sense that such a plus is accepted
more readily than a plus that, however imperfectly, attempts to
remedy the effects of prior racial discrimination.
E. Affirmative Action after Adarand-The Current Test is not Fatal
in Fact
Leaving aside the debate as to whether an affirmative action
program that seeks to benefit minorities should be subjected to some
lesser degree of scrutiny than strict scrutiny,264 it is still necessary to
apply the standard articulated in Adarand to affirmative action. The
strict scrutiny test that the Court expressed in Adarand is not "strict in
theory but fatal in fact" 2 65 because compelling governmental interests
demand a race-based solution. Moreover, recent cases demonstrate
262. STEPHEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991).
263. See Sanoff, supra note 259, at 48.
264. But see Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (expressing a willingness to apply
intermediate scrutiny to a "benign" race-based measure).
265. The issue was first articulated in these terms in Gerald Gunther's article, Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
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how a race based affirmative action admissions program can be
tailored narrowly. Finally, history demonstrates that there are no
viable race-neutral alternatives.
As Justice Stevens asserted in Adarand, the label "strict scrutiny"
has "usually been understood to spell the death of any governmental
action to which the court may apply it."'2 66 If such is the case, the
debate on color-conscious affirmative action admissions programs
need go no further. But Justice O'Connor2 67 and other members of the
Court268 have assured us that such is not the case.
Only two Justices have overtly indicated that the test they would
apply guarantees fatality. For Justice Scalia, the Court's Adarand test
was indeed fatal in fact.269 He stated, "It is unlikely, if not impossible,
that the challenged program would survive under this understanding
of strict scrutiny. T27° It is clear that Justice Thomas would take the
same position.27 ' There is a disturbing trend in the direction of a test
that would end all affirmative action programs-including those in
educational admissions-regardless of how compelling the interests
or how narrow the tailoring. Nonetheless, Justices Scalia and Thomas
have not yet forged a majority on this point. Therefore, the strict
scrutiny test, while a formidable obstacle to the creation or
maintenance of an affirmative action admissions plan, is not fatal in
fact.
1. Compelling State Interests
In attempting to determine the nature of the compelling state
interests that may justify a color-conscious affirmative action
admissions program, a number of questions remain unanswered.
First, is the remedying of the present effects of past societal
266. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. See 515 U.S. at 237 ("Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict
in theory, but fatal in fact."').
268. See, e.g., Fulfilove, 448 U.S. at 519, in which Justice Marshall stated, "[w]e wish to
dispel any notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory but fatal in fact."' Id.
269. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
270. Id.
271. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas stated, "There
can be no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this program is at war
with the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution."
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discrimination an appropriate rationale, or must the affirmative action
program be aimed at the effects of prior discrimination by the
specific state actor seeking to implement the affirmative action plan?
Second, is diversity a compelling interest? Finally, is there any
remaining vitality to the role model theory in the context of higher
education?
To pass strict scrutiny, the case law suggests that the prior
discrimination that has left present effects must have been committed
by the specific state actor seeking to apply a color-conscious
affirmative action remedy. Although this conclusion is by no means
logical, it does not create a truly fatal test. Strict scrutiny becomes
fatal only when, as was the case in Podberesky and Hopwood, the
court ignores overwhelming evidence or declares it statistically
invalid.
The question of whether or not to consider the racial diversity of a
student body as a compelling interest is an academic issue subject to
special deference under the First Amendment. 272 Because the
Supreme Court has not considered a higher education admissions
case since Bakke, no recent case has considered diversity in that
context. Moreover, although the value of diversity was ignored by the
majority opinion in Hopwood, a number of circuit court judges have
concluded that the diversity rationale is still alive. Still others have
concluded that, however moribund, only the Supreme Court can
deliver the death blow to the diversity rationale. 73
The issue of the diversity rationale will remain open until the
272. See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 203. Professor Shropshire would argue that diversity has
a significant impact:
Once diversity is introduced into any setting, those accustomed to a monochromatic
institution must change. Both blatant and unconscious acts of racism are more likely to
be addressed by a diverse group. People of diverse backgrounds generally will provide
a varied perspective and encourage more thoughtful viewpoints from others.
SHROPSHIRE, supra note 203, at 39; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (noting the First
Amendment's "special concern" with academic freedom).
273. See 78 F.3d at 965 (Weidner, J., concurring) (stating he would pass over the question
of diversity as a compelling state interest for race-based affirmative action programs, waiting
for the Supreme Court to decide the issue). Seven Fifth Circuit Judges emphatically stated in
Hopwood, "Lest there be any doubt, we are firmly convinced that, until the Supreme Court
expressly overrules Bakke, student body diversity is a compelling governmental interest for the
purposes of strict scrutiny." Hopwood, 84 F. 3d at 724 n.11 (denying rehearing en bane).
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Supreme Court decides to answer it. Similarly, the question of
whether the role model theory can be applied to higher education
must await Supreme Court determination because the holding of
Wygant is sufficiently off point to provide hope that this theory is still
alive.
2. Narrow Tailoring and Race-Neutral Alternatives
The concept of narrow tailoring can be used to prevent the
unfortunate consequences of sloppy or lazy administration of
affirmative action programs. Unfortunately, affirmative action
opponents also attempt to use narrow tailoring to assure that the strict
scrutiny test is fatal in fact. The University of Maryland's present
"sin" in Podberesky, discriminating against a Hispanic in favor of a
black Jamaican in the awarding of a scholarship, was not adequately
tailored to the University's prior sins, which included discrimination
against Maryland residents of African descent. 74 Presumably, the
University's program could have satisfied the narrow-tailoring test by
requiring the Jamaican to compete against only white students for the
scholarship. Accordingly, the Hispanic student could have been
spared unfavorable treatment that lacked any historical justification.
Thus, it would seem that one key to narrow tailoring would be the
avoidance of any "plusses" that result in a detriment to members of
groups who did not previously benefit from an actor's societal
discrimintation.
Similarly, an overly strict application of the race-neutral
alternatives strand of strict scrutiny analysis can be used to assure
that strict scrutiny is indeed fatal in fact. There are always
theoretically workable race-neutral alternatives available, and they
almost always fail to work. For example, faced with a lack of
diversity caused by a lack of minority ownership in the radio and
television industries, the FCC attempted a variety of race-neutral
solutions over a period of eighteen years before adopting the race-
274. Although far beyond the scope of this Article, a case could be made for an African-
Caribbean-American suffering the present effects of past United States discrimination. See
MICHAEL MANLEY, JAMAICA: STRUGGLE IN THE PERIPHERY (1982).
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conscious measures that prompted Metro Broadcasting.
27 5
Nevertheless, writing in dissent, Justice O'Connor wrote that race-
neutral means of enhancing broadcast diversity existed.276 Similarly,
in Paradise, the Court was presented with facts that demonstrated
that there had been four decades of blatant racial discrimination in the
Alabama state troopers department, as well as more than a decade of
equally blatant resistance to court-ordered desegregation. 2"
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor again argued for race-neutral
alternatives.278
As Justice Blackmun pointed out in Bakke, when we turn to "the
real world of which we are all a part,' 279 it is a fact of life that some
race-based measures are necessary:
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-
action program in a racially neutral way and have it successful.
To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In order to
get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is
no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we
must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the
Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.
280
VI. CONCLUSION
The degree to which institutions of higher education can utilize
affirmative action programs that take race into account is unclear at
this time. The fact that such programs will be subject to strict scrutiny
does not end the matter, but merely sets the stage for a variety of
possibilities.
In Bakke, Justice Powell argued that creating a diverse student
body was a compelling state interest that could withstand strict
scrutiny, but he was not able to convince a majority of the Court to
275. See supra note 114.
276. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 622 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
277. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
278. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 199-200.
279. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part).
280. Id.
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sign his opinion. The Court has declared that remedying the present
effects of prior discrimination is also a compelling state interest, but
it is unclear whether the discrimination in question can be societal, or
must be specific to the state actor seeking to apply the affirmative
action remedy. Although Adarand made it clear that strict scrutiny
would be applied in all cases in which state actors use race-based
decision making, Adarand did not involve the unique situation of
higher education 281 and, thus, left many issues unresolved. In
Podberesky and Hopwood, the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of
Appeals attempted to resolve the issue by denying that Bakke has any
precedential value and crafting tests that are "strict in theory but fatal
in fact."
This Article has argued that affirmative action programs that do
not constitute quotas and do not violate the Equal Protection Clause
can survive strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has never held that
creating a racially diverse student body is not a compelling state
interest. The Court has also never stated that an affirmative action
program can only address the present effects of prior discrimination
by the specific actor seeking to apply the remedy. Therefore, the tests
that the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals created are much
narrower than the Supreme Court's test.
Opponents of affirmative action have attacked remedial programs
by arguing that a color-blind Constitution prohibits any race-based
decision-making. The fault of this argument is that the color-blind
Constitution is a myth. The Constitution was not drafted as a color-
blind document and was not initially interpreted by the Supreme
Court as color-blind. Moreover, even though Congress had the clear
opportunity to make the Constitution color-blind with the
Reconstruction Amendments, it chose to leave it as a color-conscious
document.
Finally, the primary constitutional basis for the color-blind myth,
the Equal Protection Clause, was an impediment to minority progress
during much of its history. Thus, the central irony of the myth of a
color-blind Constitution has been that, for most of our history, the
courts have been far from color-blind in their discrimination against
281. See515U.S. at212-37.
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minorities. Only now, when the Constitution has been used in a
color-conscious manner to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination, has the myth of a color-blind Constitution arisen. To
heighten the irony, this process has taken place in a society that is far
from color-blind and plagued with present effects of past
discrimination. It is the centuries of past discrimination that makes
race such a useful proxy for disadvantage.
In the 1850s, the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott was
seen as a reflection of the unbiased reality that there existed an
inferior race entitled to paternalistic concerns, but certainly not
entitled to the right to vote. In the 1890s, society saw Dred Scott as
overtly racist and a product of less enlightened times. However, the
same society saw the Plessy doctrine of separate but equal as a
modem, enlightened understanding of the relationship between the
white and black races. Today's society sees Plessy as overtly racist
and views the myth of a color-blind Constitution as the product of
enlightened times. Will some future generation see the strict scrutiny
of Adarand, the Scalia/Thomas color-blind Constitution, and the
dismantling of affirmative action as the final stage in the continuum
from slavery to equality? Or, instead, like Dred Scott and Plessy, will
future generations see today's court decisions as the embarrassing
relics of an unenlightened past?
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